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Abstract		The	present	paper	explores	the	correlation	between	political	systems,	and	fiscal	policies,	very	 much	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	 the	 seminal	 work	 by	 Roubini	 and	 Sachs	 (1989),	 thus	focusing	 on	 the	 relative	 dispersion	 or	 concentration	 of	 political	 power	 as	 the	 main	political	characteristic.	The	principal	theoretical	goal	is	to	predict	those	changes	in	fiscal	policy	 that	 may	 be	 induced	 by	 modifications	 in	 the	 partisan	 structure	 of	 political	systems,	 as	 compared	 to	 cross-sectional	 differences	 between	 constitutional	 systems.	Following	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 cash-based,	 and	 the	 accrual	 based	 approach	 to	public	 finance,	 the	 paper	 attempts	 to	 study	 the	 government’s	 fiscal	 stance	 as	 capital	balances,	 besides	 treating	 the	 current	 flows.	 The	 theoretical	model	 introduced	 in	 this	paper	attempts	to	define	the	possible	appropriation	of	liquid	assets	in	the	public	sector,	starting	from	the	basic	fiscal	equation.	Empirical	research	presented	consists	of	both	a	quantitative,	econometric	part,	and	qualitative	case	studies.	The	classification	of	political	systems	is	based	on	the	distinctions	introduced	in	the	Database	of	Political	Systems,	as	published	 by	 the	 World	 Bank.	 Said	 distinctions	 regard	 the	 possible	 concentration	 of	power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 president,	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 proportionality	 in	 the	 electoral	regime;	 they	 form	 the	 constitutional	 frames	 of	 the	 political	 system.	 The	 degree	 of	political	 polarization	 regarding	 economic	 policy	 is	 the	 main	 measure	 of	 partisan	fragmentation.	Quantitative	research	allowed	concluding	that	political	systems	do	differ	as	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 liquid	 capital	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector.	 Three	 broad	 clusters	 of	countries	were	 defined,	 regarding	 their	 political	 systems,	 and	 these	 clusters	 display	 a	significant	disparity	as	for	the	observable	fiscal	stance.	Case	studies	sampled	from	those	clusters	 lead	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 amount	 of	 liquid	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	changes	 in	 close	 correlation	 to	 political	 polarization.	 The	 main	 path	 open	 for	 future	research	 is	 the	 question	 whether	 fiscal	 variables	 can	 indicate	 pre-emptively	 the	emergence	of	political	veto	players,	even	before	their	official	appearance	in	the	partisan,	or	the	constitutional	structure.									 	
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1	Introduction		Research	on	fiscal	policy	encompasses	the	issue	of	the	so-called	structural	factors	of	the	government’s	fiscal	stance.	The	“structural	factors”	in	question	refer,	to	a	great	extent,	to	the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 political	 system	 in	 place.	 In	 1989,	 Roubini	 and	 Sachs	introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 structural	 debt	 to	 GDP	 ratio,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 cyclically	determined	 one	 (Roubini,	 Sachs	 1989 1 ).	 They	 made	 a	 connection	 between	 that	structural	 tendency	 to	 indebtedness,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	political	system	in	place	-	more	specifically	to	the	relative	strength	of	the	government	in	wage	bargaining.	The	more	dispersed	political	power,	 the	 lesser	that	strength,	and	the	greater	 proneness	 to	 the	 accumulation	 of	 public	 debt.	 In	 empirical	 terms,	 that	theoretical	 construct	 was	 used	 to	 explain	 increasing,	 but	 unevenly	 increasing	 public	debt	in	the	developed	countries	over	the	1970s	and	the	1980s.		A	substantial	body	of	research	focuses	mostly	on	the	cyclical	factors	of	fiscal	policy,	and,	in	 the	 same	 time,	 on	 the	 normative	 approach	 to	 said	 policy.	 We	 can	 designate	 this	approach	as	macroeconomic	optimization	of	public	policies.	 In	this	 intellectual	stream,	the	main	question	is:	what	should	the	fiscal	policy	consist	in,	in	order	to	be	optimally	or	nearly	optimally	efficient	(see	for	example:	Arestis,	Sawyer	20032,	Arestis	20093).		Macroeconomic	optimization	of	public	policies	assumes	that	fiscal	policy	consists	most	of	all	in	managing	the	current	macroeconomic	forces	that	impact	the	fiscal	performance.	Basic	 fiscal	 aggregates	 –	 spending,	 tax	 revenues	 and	 debt	 –	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 the	cumulative	 effect	 of	 a	 series	 of	 current,	 short	 term	 adaptations,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	government,	 to	 the	 macroeconomic	 situation	 at	 hand.	 In	 this	 view,	 budgetary	 deficit	happens	or	increases	when	the	government	fails	to	match	its	spending	to	tax	revenues.	An	 implicit	 assumption	here	 is	 that	 the	null	 fiscal	 balance,	with	 spending	 equal	 to	 tax	revenues,	is	the	fiscal	equilibrium.	Any	departing	from	that	heavenly	state	is	a	symptom	of	disequilibrium.	Consequently,	public	borrowing	is	a	compensatory	action	on	the	part	of	the	government,	to	stay	financially	liquid	when	in	financial	distress.																																																										
1 Roubini, N., Sachs, J., 1989, Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, Economic Policy, 8, 
pp. 700-32 
2 Arestis, P., Sawyer, M., 2003, Reinventing Fiscal Policy, The Levy Economics Institute and the University of Leeds, Working 
Paper No. 381   
3 Arestis, P., 2009, New Consensus Macroeconomics: A Critical Appraisal, The Levy Economics Institute and the University of Leeds, 
Working Paper No. 564 
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In	political	sciences,	this	approach	to	fiscal	policy	is	somehow	reflected	in	the	so-called	“pork	 barrel	 theory”	 (see	 for	 example:	 Weingast	 et	 al.	 19814),	 which	 states	 that	 the	relative	disparity	 of	 interests	 among	 social	 groups	 represented	 in	 the	political	 system	impacts	government	expenditure.	 Just	 as	more	different	pigs	means	 the	necessity	of	 a	bigger	 barrel	 to	 feed	 them,	 a	 greater	 diversity	 of	 social	 interests	 represented	 in	 the	political	system	means	more	money	necessary	to	satisfy	them.	That	relationship	has	its	source	 in	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 political	 bargaining	 between	 various	 agents	 inside	 the	government.	 The	 “I-do-something-for-your-voters-if-you-do-something-for-my-voters”	pattern	of	policy	making	is	widely	known,	and	the	pork	barrel	theory	associates	it	with	fiscal	policies.	Once	more,	 just	as	 in	 the	macroeconomic	optimization	of	 fiscal	policies,	we	come	to	the	 implied	assumption	that	 there	 is	a	hypothetically	efficient	 fiscal	policy	(probably	associated	with	null	budgetary	deficit).	Both	the	cyclical	economic	factors,	and	the	 political	 bargaining	 may	 deviate	 the	 actual	 fiscal	 policy	 from	 that	 state	 of	equilibrium.		Both	 the	macroeconomic	 optimization	 of	 fiscal	 policies,	 and	 the	 pork	 barrel	 theory	 in	political	sciences	refer	to	the	concept	of	efficiency	in	public	policies.	Going	even	more	in	depth	of	their	assumptions,	one	can	see	that	efficiency	of	public	policies	is	evaluated	on	the	 grounds	 of	 macroeconomic	 outcomes.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 this	 perspective,	governments	 are	 par	 excellence	 subservient	 to	 their	 nations.	 That,	 of	 course,	 reflects	some	aspects	of	public	policies,	yet	not	all	of	those	aspects.	There	is	a	theoretical	stream	in	macroeconomics,	designated	sometimes	as	the	theory	of	endogenous	growth,	which	points	 at	 an	 interesting	 paradox:	 governments	 are	 systematically	 counter-rational	 in	their	 fiscal	 policies.	 They	 conflate	 their	 deficits	 in	 the	 times	 of	 prosperity,	whilst	 they	should	 benefit	 of	 said	 prosperity	 to	 buckle	 up	 their	 accounts	 a	 little.	 Conversely,	 our	rulers	consistently	 try	 to	 reduce	 their	deficits	 in	 times	of	 cyclical	 crises,	when	 the	 last	rational	 thing	 to	 do	 is	 to	 cut	 on	 government	 spending	 	 (see	 for	 example:	 (np.	 Barro	19905;	King,	Rebelo	19906;	Turnovsky	20007;	Afonso,	Claeys	20078).	
																																																								
4 Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., Johnsen, C., 1981, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to 
Distributive Politics, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89(4), pp. 642-664  
5 Barro, R., 1990, Government spending in a simple model of endogeneous growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, no. 98, pp. 103-125 
6 King, R., Rebelo, S., 1990, Public policy and economic growth: developing neoclassical implications, Journal of 
Political Economy, no. 98, pp. 126-150 
7 Turnovsky, S., 2000, Fiscal policy, elastic labour supply and endogenous growth, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, no. 45, pp. 185-210 
8 Afonso, A., Claeys, P., 2007, The Dynamic Behaviour of Budget Components and Output, European Central 
Bank, Working Paper Series, no.775, July 2007 
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Macroeconomic	 optimization	 is	 excellent	 for	 normative	 purposes,	 to	 show	 the	 most	efficient	direction	for	public	policies.	Yet,	it	is	a	poor	predictor	of	actual	public	policies,	as	governments	consistently	depart	from	the	golden	path.	As	the	point	of	any	theory	is	prediction,	some	theory	is	needed	to	predict	the	actual	public	policies.	Governments	are	power,	 governments	 have	 power	 and	 they	 use	 that	 power	 for	 their	 own,	 egoistic	purposes:	this	is	the	point	of	view	to	find	in	the	theory	of	Max	Weber,	as	well	as	in	the	systems	 theory	 of	 Nicklas	 Luhmann,	 and	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 discursive	 legitimation	 of	Jurgen	 Habermas.	 Among	 other	 components,	 public	 policies	 express	 egoistic	 political	power	in	action.	James	Buchanan	was	probably	one	of	the	first	economists	to	show	a	systemic	approach	to	the	interaction	between	fiscal	policy	and	politics,	with	a	focus	on	the	descriptive	side	of	the	problem	(see:	Buchanan	19769;	Buchanan,	Wagner	1977)10.	This	path	of	research,	attempting	 to	make	a	 theory	about	 that	 interaction,	has	been	developing	steadily	over	the	last	three	decades,	yet	staying	more	or	less	in	the	shadow	of	the	cyclically-oriented	school	in	the	research	about	fiscal	policy	(see	for	example:	Schick	1998a11;	1998b12).	The	main	outcome	of	studies	at	the	frontier	of	politics	and	macroeconomics	is	that	the	fiscal	adaptation	to	cyclical	economic	factors	is	always	limited	in	its	breadth	and	scope	by	 structural	 attributes	 of	 the	 political	 system.	 The	 works	 of	 Alberto	 Alesina	 and	Roberto	 Perotti,	 among	 others,	 attempt	 to	 delve	 into	 the	 fine	 details	 of	 politics	 at	 the	level	of	public	finance	(see	for	example:	Alesina,	Perotti	1995a13,	1995b14,	199615).	The	 present	 paper	 attempts	 a	 contribution	 to	 constructing	 theoretical	 tools	 for	 the	prediction	of	actual	fiscal	policies,	according	to	the	characteristics	of	the	political	system	in	place,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 future	possible	 changes	 in	 that	 system.	 In	 other	words,	some	kind	of	 fiscal	 function	of	 the	political	system	looms	at	 the	horizon.	The	first,	and	probably	the	most	important	question	is	whether	at	all,	and	for	what	reasons	should	we	consider	 the	 characteristics	 of	 political	 systems	as	 structural,	 regarding	 fiscal	 policies,																																																									
9 Buchanan, J., 1976, Barro on The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, Journal of Political Economy, no. 84, April 1976, pp. 337 
- 342 
10 Some scholars question the connection between the concept of „Ricardian equivalence”, and David Ricardo’s work. See for 
example: O’Driscoll, G.P., 1977, The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem, Journal of Political Economy, no. 85, February 
1977, pp. 207 – 210 
11 Schick, A., 1998, A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management, World Bank Institute  
12 Schick, A., 1998,  Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand's Reforms, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 
13, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 123-131   
13 Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1995, Reducing Budget Deficits, May 1995, revised: September 1995, prepared for the conference “Growing 
Government Debt – International Experiences”, Stockholm, June 1995 
14 Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1995, Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries, First version: April 1995, Revised: June 1995, 
Prepared for the Economic Policy Panel, April 1995 
15 Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1996, Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, vol. 86, 
no. 2, Balanced – Budget Rules, pp. 401-407 
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and	oppose	them	to	cyclical	 factors	 like	 inflation,	exchange	rates	or	unemployment.	 In	other	 words,	 are	 politics	 really	 more	 “structural”	 than,	 for	 example,	 the	 patterns	observable	in	the	labour	market	or	in	the	stock	exchange?	After	all,	and	especially	in	the	case	 of	 developed	 countries,	 the	 long	 terms	 trends	 of	 inflation	 or	 unemployment	 are	frequently	more	predictable	than	public	policies	and	political	institutions.		Three	intuitive	distinctions	seem	to	underlie	the	general,	theoretical	dichotomy	between	the	cyclical	and	the	structural	factors	of	fiscal	policies.	Firstly,	macroeconomic	changes	impact	 the	 actual	 tax	 revenues.	 The	 same	 tax	 base	 yields	 different	 tax	 revenue,	 and	creates	 various	 pressures	 for	 public	 borrowing,	 according	 to	 the	 rate	 of	 inflation,	economic	 growth	 and	 unemployment.	 Secondly,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 demonstrate	econometrically	 that	 in	 the	overall	 variance	of	 the	actual	 fiscal	balance	 there	 is	 a	part	clearly	attributable	to	the	variance	of	macroeconomic	factors.	The	remaining	residual	is	called	“structural	balance”.	Thirdly,	there	is	the	“exogenous	<>	endogenous”	dichotomy.	We	tend	to	consider	political	factors	as	structural	just	because	we	see	them	as	inherent	to	the	given,	national	social	system.	On	the	other	hand,	factors	that	we	use	to	call	cyclical	(inflation,	unemployment	etc.)	are	perceived	as	at	 least	partly	exogenous	and	imposed	by	global	economic	trends.		That	last	distinction	(i.e.	endogenous	<>	exogenous)	seems	to	be	the	soundest	approach,	yet	 there	 is	 a	 theoretical	 doubt	 to	 elucidate.	 If	 political	 factors	were	 considered	 to	 be	strictly	 endogenous,	 there	would	be	no	point	 in	 any	 cross-sectional	 comparison,	 or	 in	any	 congruent	 measurement	 of	 political	 characteristics	 (see	 for	 example:	 Almond	195616).	 There	 is	 need	 for	 some	kind	of	 common	denominator(s)	 in	political	 systems.	That	 common	denominator	 is	 to	be	 found	both	 in	 the	 classics,	 and	 in	 the	most	 recent	developments.	As	for	the	classics,	there	is	an	old	claim,	postulated	by	Francois	Quesnay,	Adam	Smith,	David	Ricardo,	and	Jean	Baptiste	Say:	public	spending	 is	rather	a	 form	of	circulating	 capital	 than	 a	 financial	 flow	 strictly	 spoken.	 The	 assumption	 that	governments	manage	capital	balances	rather	than	flows	seem	to	be	constantly	present	in	 the	 discourse	 about	 public	 policy.	 The	 French	 historical	 school	 (see	 for	 example:	Braudel	 198117),	 as	 well	 as	 to	 its	 newest	 developments	 in	 economics	 (e.g.	 Piketty	201318)	claim	very	much	the	same.	Strangely	enough,	that	assumption	can	be	used	for	quite	 disparate	 argumentations,	 as,	 for	 example,	 those	 about	 the	 burden	 created	 by																																																									
16 Almond, A.G., 1956, Comparative Political Systems, The Journal of Politics, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 391 - 409 
17 Braudel, F., 1981, Civilization and Capitalism, Vol. I: The Structures of Everyday Life, rev.ed., English Translation, William Collins Sons 
& Co London and Harper & Row New York, ISBN 00216303 9 
18 Piketty, T., 2013, Le capital au XXIe siècle, Editions du Seuil, Paris 
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public	debt.	Both	the	advocates	of	debt	seen	as	a	burden	(e.g.	Meade	195819;	Modigliani	196120;	 Diamond	 196521),	 and	 the	 partisans	 of	 the	 so-called	 Ricardian	 equivalence	(Sraffa	 195122;	 Barro	 197423,	 197924,	 198625,	 198726,	 1989a27,	 1989b28;	 197629)	implicitly	assume	that	public	borrowing	creates	some	sort	of	additional	liquidity	in	the	capital	balances	of	 the	economy.	As	 far	as	public	debt	 is	concerned,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	point	out	that	borrowing	is	essentially	a	legal	tool	for	facilitating	the	transfer	of	capital.	Once	more,	we	return	to	the	classics,	and	to	Adam	Smith’s	intuition	that	massive	public	borrowing	takes	place	when	there	is	a	wealthy	class	of	private	owners	with	substantial	financial	surpluses	to	invest.	In	other	words,	governments	borrow	mostly	because	they	can,	not	because	 they	have	 to.	Over	80%	of	 the	global,	gross	public	debt	 is	owed	by	6	highly	 developed	 economies:	 United	 States,	 Japan,	 Germany,	 France,	 United	 Kingdom,	and	Italy.	One	possible	interpretation	of	this	stylized	fact	is	that	the	biggest	economies	absorb	 the	 major	 part	 of	 global	 macroeconomic	 shocks,	 and	 thus	 accumulated	 the	greatest	 mass	 of	 public	 debt.	 Still,	 another	 explanation	 is	 possible.	 In	 the	 times	 of	economic	 shocks,	 investors	 are	 risk	 averse;	 they	 turn	 massively	 away	 from	 risky	investment	 in	 productive	 assets	 and	 shift	 their	 investment	 towards	 much	 less	 risky	sovereign	 debt.	 Hence,	 massive	 accumulation	 of	 public	 debt	 occurs	 not	 only	 as	 a	symptom	 of	 financial	 distress	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 governments,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 shift	 in	investment	strategies	played	in	financial	markets.	Thus,	we	 face	 those	 two	 possible	 approaches	 to	 fiscal	 policy.	 It	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 the	management	of	current	flows,	with	the	null	fiscal	balance	being	the	state	of	equilibrium.	Conversely	(or	complementarily),	fiscal	policy	may	be	considered	as	public	management	of	capital	balances.	Here	we	come	back	to	the	connection	between	political	systems,	and	fiscal	 policies.	 Roubini	 and	 Sachs	 argue	 that	 political	 systems	 differ	 in	 their	 inherent																																																									
19 Meade, J.,E., 1958, Is the National Debt a Burden, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 10, Issue 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 126 - 150 
20 Modigliani, F., 1961, Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies And the Burden of the National Debt, Economic 
Journal, no. 71, pp. 730 - 755 
21 Diamond, P., E., 1965, National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model, The American Economic Review, volume 55, issue 5 
(Dec., 1965), pp. 1126 - 1150 
22 Sraffa, P., 1951, The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume IV, Pamphlets and Papers, 1815 – 1823, „Funding 
System”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
23 Barro, R.J., 1974, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Political Economy, no. 82, November/December 1974, 
pp. 1095 - 1117 
24 Barro, R.J., 1979, On The Determination of the Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy, no. 87, October 1979, pp. 940 - 
971 
25 Barro, R.J., 1986, U.S. Deficits Since World War I, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 88 no.1, pp. 195 - 222 
26 Barro, R.J., 1987, Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices and Budget Deficits in the United Kingdom, 1701 – 1918, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, September 1987, no. 20, pp. 221 - 247 
27 Barro, R.J., 1989, The Neoclassical Approach to Fiscal Policy, w: Barro, R.J. (ed.), 1989, Modern Business Cycle Theory, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press 
28 Barro, R.,J., The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1989, 
pp. 37 - 54 
29 Buchanan, J., 1976, Barro on The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, Journal of Political Economy, no. 84, April 1976, pp. 337 
- 342 
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aptitude	 to	 deal	with	macroeconomic	 shocks:	 countries	with	more	 dispersed	 political	power	tend	to	be	feebler	in	their	response	to	such	shocks	than	countries	with	noticeably	more	concentrated	political	power.	Conversely,	 the	present	paper	argues	 that	political	systems	 differ	 in	 their	 fiscal	 stances	 mostly	 because	 there	 is	 a	 close	 match	 between	political	systems,	and	the	amount	of	capital	those	systems	need	to	work.	In	that	respect,	the	 research	 follows	 the	 theoretical	 path	 set	 by	 Barry	 Weingast	 and	 his	 claim	 that	political	systems	work	to	a	large	extent	as	a	game	of	claims	on	capital,	played	between	public	and	private	agents	(see	for	example:	Weingast	198130,	199531).	The	present	paper	claims	 that	 each	 individual	 political	 system	 rests	 on	 a	 specific	 amount	 of	 legitimation	conferred	 to	 public	 rulers	 through	 a	 long-term,	 discursive	 process,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 a	specific	 appropriation	 of	 capital	 by	 the	 public	 sector.	 Jurgen	 Habermas’s	 theory	 of	politics	 (Habermas	 197532,	 197933,	 199634),	 and	 Nancy	 Fraser’s	 concept	 of	 “strong	publics”	 (Fraser	 199035 )	 are	 an	 additional	 theoretical	 reference	 in	 that	 respect.	Appropriation	 of	 capital	 is	 understood	 as	 such	 a	 natural	 possession	 of	 capital,	 which	through	 its	 duration	 and	 autonomy	 from	 external	 claims	 allows	 the	 appropriation	 of	capital	rent.	Two	interesting	intellectual	streams	have	been	emerging	recently,	and	they	seem	quite	promising	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	research:	the	theory	of	veto	players,	and	the	initiative	known	as	the	Database	of	Political	Institutions.	The	theory	of	veto	players,	as	introduced	 by	 George	 Tsebelis	 (see	 for	 example:	 Tsebelis	 200236),	 characterises	 the	current	state	of	any	political	system	through	 its	relative	capacity	 for	policy	change,	or,	conversely,	its	tendency	to	preserve	the	status	quo.	Any	status	quo	has	its	counterpart	in	the	so-called	winset,	which	is	the	set	of	its	realistically	taken	alternatives.	The	success	of	any	policy,	whether	in	favour	of	the	status	quo,	or	of	its	winset,	stems	from	the	number	and	 strength	 of	 veto	 players,	who	 support	 it.	 Veto	 players	 are	 “individual	or	collective	
actors	whose	agreement	is	necessary	for	a	change	of	the	status	quo”.	The	 current	 status	quo	rests	on	the	unanimity	core,	or	the	set	of	actions	that	meet	common	agreement	of	all	the	veto	players.	As	 they	all	 agree	about	 the	policies	 contained	 in	 the	unanimity	 core,																																																									
30  Weingast, B., 1981, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol.44, No.1, pp. 147 - 177 
31 Weingast, B., 1995, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, The Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 11, No.1, pp. 1 - 29 
32 Habermas, J., 1975, Legitimation Crisis, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston, 1975 
33 Habermas, J., 1979, Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston 1979 
34 Habermas, J., 1996, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, translated by William Rehg, Second Printing 
35 Fraser, Nancy (1990), Rethinking the Public Sphere. A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, Social 
Text, vol. 25/26, pp. 56-80  
36 Tsebelis, G., 2002, Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton University Press. 
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non	of	them	supports	any	change	to	it.	The	more	veto	players	are	there	in	the	political	system,	the	larger	is	the	unanimity	core,	and	the	least	is	the	likelihood	of	policy	change.	In	other	words,	more	veto	players	give	more	inertia	to	current	policies.	Veto	players	can	emerge	or	disappear	through	a	twofold	mechanism	of	institutional	change.	Firstly,	they	can	 be	 institutional	 veto	 players,	 designated	 as	 such	 through	 the	 legal	 rules	 of	 the	constitutional	 order.	 Secondly,	 they	 can	 emerge	 as	 partisan	 veto	 players,	 i.e.	 political	forces	 that	 form	 within	 the	 space	 given	 to	 political	 rivalry	 by	 the	 given	 set	 of	constitutional	 rules.	 Ideological	 distances	 between	 individual	 veto	 players	 are	 just	 as	important	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 policies,	 as	 the	 constitutional	 division	 of	 powers.	 For	example,	 the	 ideological	distance	between	the	president	 in	office,	and	the	majoritarian	party	in	the	parliament	may	influence	the	policy	making	just	as	strongly,	as	would	do	the	constitutional	 partition	 of	 powers	 between	 the	 president,	 and	 the	 parliament.	 A	substantial	 body	 of	 research	 claims	 that	 the	 partisan	 fragmentation	 within	 a	 given	constitutional	 framework	 has	 significant	 impact	 upon	 public	 policies	 (Weingast	 et	 al.	198137;	Mukherjee	200338;	Bawn	and	Rosenbluth	200639;	Eslava,	Nupia	201040).		The	theory	of	veto	players	seems	to	be	one	of	the	theoretical	pillars	of	the	Database	of	Political	 Institutions,	(DPI),	as	published	by	the	World	Bank	(Beck	et	al	200141;	Keefer	201242).	The	DPI	attempts	a	 long-expected	classification	of	political	systems.	The	main	axes	of	discrimination	seem	to	be	internal	diversity,	and	stability.	The	former	refers	to	variously	measured	number	of	distinct	veto	players,	both	constitutional	and	partisan.	As	for	structural	stability,	it	is	the	opposite	of	democratic	competition	in	the	system.		Constitutional	 orders	 change	 slowly,	 and	 not	 very	 frequently.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	partisan	structure	of	political	systems	may	change	much	faster.	An	interesting	question	appears	 in	 that	context,	namely	whether	at	all	and	 to	what	extent	can	a	change	 in	 the	partisan	 structure	 within	 a	 given	 constitutional	 order	 impact	 the	 pattern	 of	 capital	appropriation	 in	 public	 agents,	 and	 what	 overall	 changes	 in	 fiscal	 policy	 can	 such	 a	change	provoke.	This	is	the	predictive	issue	that	the	present	paper	attempts	to	explore.																																																										
37 Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., Johnsen, C., 1981, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to 
Distributive Politics, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89(4), pp. 642-664  
38 Mukherjee, B., 2003, Political Parties and the Size of Government in Multiparty Legislatures: Examining Cross-Country and 
Panel Data Evidence, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36(6), pp. 699-728  
39 Bawn, K., and Rosenbluth, F., 2006, Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public 
Sector, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50 (2), pp. 251-265  
40 Eslava, M., Nupia, O., 2010, Political Fragmentation and Government Spending: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the 
Picture, Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Economia, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarollo Economico, ISSN 1657-5334 
41 Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., 2001, New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 165–176 
42 Keefer, P., 2012, Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions, Development Research Group The 
World Bank, December 2012 
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2	The	theoretical	model		The	 theoretical	 model	 of	 the	 issues	 studies	 aims	 at	 showing,	 how	 exactly	 does	 the	process	of	capital	appropriation	in	the	public	sector	take	place.	The	starting	point	is	the	basic	 fiscal	equation,	namely:	revenues	+	borrowing	=	expenditures.	That	basic	equation	is	modified	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	research,	by	adding	a	second	component	on	the	right	side,	namely	capital	accumulation.	Equation	(1)	formalizes	this	modified	view,	where	 T	 stands	 for	 revenues	 (which	 are	 usually	 and	 for	 the	 major	 part	 made	 of	 tax	revenues),	∆D	means	current	borrowing	or	the	change	in	the	overall	gross	public	debt,	E	represents	gross	expenditures	of	the	government,	and	∆C	is	the	change	in	capital	held	by	the	government.			
𝑇 + ∆𝐷 = 𝐸 + ∆𝐶                        (1) 	Equation	 (1)	 follows	 the	 stylized	 fact	 that	most	 governments,	 whatever	 their	 current	fiscal	 flows,	 hold	 some	 capital	 goods	 other	 than	 the	 strictly	 spoken	 financial	 means	necessary	 to	 finance	 current	 expenses.	 The	 right	 side	 of	 the	 equation	 represents	 the	numerical	 outcome	 of	 a	 structure	 at	work.	 The	 structure	 in	 question	 is	made	 of	 four	types	 of	 public	 entities,	 namely:	 budgetary	 units,	 public	 executive	 agencies,	 public	targeted	funds,	and	public-private	partnerships.	Budgetary	units	are	the	building	blocks	of	 the	 strictly	 spoken	 administrative	 structure	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 They	 are	 fully	financed	 through	 the	 current	 budget	 of	 the	 government,	 and	 fully	 accountable	within	one	 fiscal	 year.	 They	 use	 capital	 only	 for	 financing	 current	 expenditures,	 and	 their	appropriation	of	capital	is	based	on	the	“use	it	of	lose	it”	rule	within	the	real	budgetary	cycle.	The	latter	means	that	the	next	year	budget	is	drafted	during	the	second	quarter	of	the	preceding	fiscal	year,	and	voted	in	the	fourth	quarter.	Hence,	the	full	cycle	of	capital	appropriation	 in	 budgetary	 units	 is	 actually	 rather	 two	 fiscal	 years	 than	 one.	 The	institution	of	consolidation	in	current	public	accounts	can	create	an	additional,	shorter	cycle	of	 capital	 appropriation	 in	budgetary	units.	This	 institution	 consists	 in	 the	 right,	conferred	 usually	 to	 the	 Minister	 of	 Finance	 or	 other	 organ	 in	 charge	 of	 Treasury	matters,	 to	 consolidate	 all	 the	 temporarily	 available,	 financial	 balances	 of	 budgetary	units	on	one	account,	and	to	use	that	account	for	short-term,	financial	placements	(e.g.	overnight	deposits).				
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Public	executive	agencies	follow	specific	missions	ascribed	by	specific	laws	distinct	from	the	 budget,	 and	 from	 the	 regulations	 of	 fiscal	 governance.	 These	 laws	 form	 the	 legal	basis	of	 their	existence.	The	mission	of	executive	agencies	usually	 consists	 in	 carrying	out	 long-term	 tasks	 connected	 to	 large	 non-wage	 expenditures.	 The	 distribution	 of	targeted	 subsidies,	 or	 the	maintenance	 of	 strategic	 reserves	 of	 food	 or	medicines	 are	good	 examples.	 Public	 executive	 agencies	 have	more	 fiscal	 autonomy	 than	 budgetary	units:	they	receive	subsidies	from	the	current	budget,	but	these	subsidies	usually	do	not	make	the	full	 financial	basis	of	their	expenditures.	 In	the	same	manner,	those	agencies	can	retain	their	current	 financial	surpluses	over	many	fiscal	years.	 In	other	words,	 the	financial	 link	 of	 executive	 agencies	with	 the	 current	 fiscal	 flows	 is	 fluid	 and	 changing	from	 one	 budgetary	 cycle	 to	 another.	 The	 cycle	 of	 capital	 appropriation	 in	 executive	agencies	is	essentially	equal	to	their	actual	lifecycle	as	separate	units.		Targeted	public	funds	are	separate	public	entities	in	charge	of	managing	specific	masses	of	 capital	 paired	with	 specific	public	missions	 to	 carry	out.	 Just	 as	 executive	 agencies,	targeted	funds	have	a	separate	legal	basis	of	their	own.	Their	specificity	consists	in	quite	a	 strict	 distinction	 in	 their	 accounts:	 all	 the	 current	 costs	 of	 governance	 should	 be	covered	 out	 of	 the	 financial	 rent	 of	 the	 capital	 managed,	 and	 the	 possible	 budgetary	subsidies	should	serve	only	to	back	up	the	financial	disbursements	directly	linked	to	the	mission	 of	 the	 given	 fund.	 The	 distinction	 between	 executive	 agencies	 and	 targeted	funds	 may	 be	 fluid:	 some	 agencies	 are	 de	 facto	 funds,	 and	 some	 funds	 are	 actually	agencies.	 The	 central	 assumption	 to	 retain	 is	 that	 both	 appropriate	 capital	 quite	independently	from	the	current	budgetary	cycle.		Public-private	 partnerships	 are	 joint	 ventures,	 through	 which	 private	 agents	 are	commissioned	 to	 carry	 out	 specific	 public	 missions,	 in	 exchange	 of	 subsidies,	 direct	payments	 or	 specific	 rights.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 obvious	 examples	 are	 contract-based	healthcare	systems,	in	which	private	providers	of	healthcare	services	are	commissioned	to	fulfil	the	constitutional	mission	of	the	state	to	provide	for	citizens’	health.	More	subtle	schemes	 are	 possible,	 of	 course.	 Private	 agents	may	 provide,	with	 their	 own	 financial	means,	 for	 the	 creation	of	 some	 infrastructure	 commissioned	by	 the	 government,	 and	their	payment	is	the	right	to	exploit	said	infrastructure.		The	point	of	all	that	structural	specification	is	to	demonstrate	that	the	broad	category	of	fiscal	 flows	 that	 we	 use	 to	 call	 “public	 expenditures”	 (mostly	 for	 the	 sake	 of	convenience)	 is	actually	a	 financial	 compound.	 It	 covers	both	 the	expenditures	strictly	
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spoken	(i.e.	current	payments	for	goods	and	services),	and	capital	outlays	that	accrue	to	many	different	pockets	of	capital	appropriated	by	public	agents	in	many	different	ways.	Capital	accruals	have	different	cycles,	ranging	from	the	ultra-short	(days	or	weeks)	cycle	of	 consolidated	accounting	 in	budgetary	units,	passing	 through	 the	mid-range	 cycle	of	appropriation	 in	 executive	 agencies	 and	 public-private	 partnerships,	 up	 to	 the	frequently	 many-decade	 long	 cycle	 of	 capital	 appropriation	 in	 targeted	 public	 funds.	Each	of	those	pockets	of	capital	makes	a	unit	of	economic	power,	in	the	hands	of	some	public	agents.	Each	accrual	to	of	from	such	a	capital	pocket	means	a	shift	up	or	down	in	the	 actual	 economic	 power	 of	 those	 agents.	 Equation	 (2)	 formalizes	 this	 step	 in	theoretical	development,	with	 the	acronyms	BU,	EA,	TF,	 and	PP	 standing,	 respectively	for:	budgetary	units,	executive	agencies,	targeted	funds,	and	public-private	partnerships.	Equation	(3)	goes	further	in	this	path	and	states	that	the	total	stream	of	financial	inflows	to	public	treasury,	through	current	revenues	and	current	borrowing,	is	congruent	with	the	 sum	 of	 the	 strictly	 spoken	 public	 expenditures,	 and	 capital	 accruals	 in	 the	 public	sector.						
𝐸𝐵𝑈 + ∆𝐶𝐵𝑈 + 𝐸𝐸𝐴 + ∆𝐶𝐸𝐴 + 𝐸𝑇𝐹 + ∆𝐶𝑇𝐹 + 𝐸𝑃𝑃 + ∆𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 𝐸 + ∆𝐶         (2) 							
𝑇 + ∆𝐷 = 𝐸𝐵𝑈 + ∆𝐶𝐵𝑈 + 𝐸𝐸𝐴 + ∆𝐶𝐸𝐴 + 𝐸𝑇𝐹 + ∆𝐶𝑇𝐹 + 𝐸𝑃𝑃 + ∆𝐶𝑃𝑃        (3) 	Following	 the	 distinction	 marked	 in	 equations	 (2)	 and	 (3),	 two	 basic	 models	 of	budgetary	 accounting	 are	 possible:	 the	 cash-based	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 accrual	based	one	on	 the	other	hand.	The	cash-based	model	 largely	prevails	 in	 the	world,	and	allows	public	agents	to	record	officially	their	fiscal	flows	only	when,	and	just	when	cash	is	 spent	 or	 received,	 respectively	 as	 for	 public	 expenditures	 and	 public	 revenues.	Conversely,	the	accrual-based	model	compels	public	agents	to	record	fiscal	flows	when	the	 corresponding	 economic	 events	 take	 place;	 in	 other	 words,	 it	 assumes	 that	 the	emergence	of	liabilities	or	claims	on	the	part	of	public	agents	is	equivalent	to	actual	cash	flows.	The	cash-based	system,	still	applied	in	the	fiscal	practice	of	most	countries,	allows	public	 agents	 to	 keep	 some	 bills	 unpaid	 until	 the	 creditors	 become	 impatient	 in	 legal	terms,	 thus	 to	 create	 and	 illusion	 of	 good	 fiscal	 performance	 in	 the	meantime,	 and	 to	pump	 up	 gross	 public	 indebtedness.	 Similarly,	 that	 system	 allows	 leaving	 some	 tax	claims	 without	 actual	 enforcement,	 thus	 creating	 a	 discreetly	 governed	 system	 of	
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unofficial	 tax	 crediting	 for	 the	 chosen	 ones.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 theoretical	 model	 of	 the	present	 research,	 the	 cash-based	 system	 is	 the	 very	 foundation	 of	 all	 the	 small,	 semi-hidden	 pockets	 of	 capital	 present	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 It	 also	 encourages	 the	phenomenon	 known	 as	 budgetary	 slack,	 which	 consists	 in	 deliberate,	 financial	underperformance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 public	 agents,	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 or	 to	 retain	more	capital	 than	 they	 actually	 need	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 mission	 assigned	 (see	 for	 example:	Jensen	200343).	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 accrual-based	 system	creates	 the	obligation	 to	consider	liabilities	and	claims	as	actual	flows,	even	if	cash	does	not	change	hands.	By	the	same	means,	it	shaves	off	most	of	those	little	pockets	of	capital.		As	for	the	left	side	of	the	fiscal	equation,	the	present	model	assumes	a	deep,	qualitative	distinction	 between	 current	 public	 revenues	 (mostly	 taxation)	 and	 borrowing,	understood	as	accruals.	Public	revenues	are	based	on	unilateral,	valid	claims	on	the	part	of	the	government.	In	a	balance	sheet,	those	claims	are	located	among	the	liquid	assets	held	by	the	public	sector.	Conversely,	borrowing	is	a	form	of	capital	transfer,	made	on	a	contractual	base.	Public	debt	is	a	liability,	and	thus	is	to	be	found	on	the	passive	side	of	the	balance	 sheet.	 Public	 debt	 of	 any	 given	 country	 is	 a	mass	 of	 capital	 that	 has	 been	transferred	to	the	government,	from	the	private	sector.	Even	if	the	past	borrowing	had	been	spent	long	ago	in	cash	flow	terms,	liabilities	remain.	That	can	be	seen	as	liquidity	transfer	 from	 the	 public	 sector	 to	 the	 private	 one:	 when	 governments	 borrow,	 and	spend	 the	 capital	 borrowed,	 they	pays	 for	 goods	 and	 services	 supplied	by	 the	private	sector,	but	keep	on	endorsing	the	 liability	resulting	 from	borrowing.	 It	 is	 important	 to	remember,	among	others,	that	a	substantial	part	of	public	spending,		namely	the	wages	of	public	officers,	are	technically	paid	to	private	persons	employed	at	the	corresponding	jobs.	Thus,	the	payroll	of	the	public	sector	is	a	cash	transfer	to	the	private	sector,	too.		Summing	up,	the	theoretical	model	applied	in	the	empirical	research	presented	further,	assumes	 that	 the	 fiscal	 stance	 of	 any	 government	 represents	 two	 different	 types	 of	financial	 occurrences:	 	 current	 flows	 and	 capital	 accruals.	 They	 can	 be	 partly	independent	from	each	other,	and	studied	separately.		Any	 veto	 player	 in	 the	 political	 system	 derives	 their	 actual	 political	 power	 from	 two	factors,	 namely	 political	 legitimation,	 and	 actual	 economic	 power	 conveyed	 by	 the	natural	 possession	 of	 capital.	 Veto	 players	 in	 the	 political	 system	 temporarily																																																									
43 Jensen, G., 2003, Zen and the Art of Budget Management: The New Zealand Treasure, Controlling Public Expenditure, 
Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, pp. 30­56.  
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appropriate	 each	 capital	 accrual	 in	 the	 public	 sector.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 present	research,	 it	 is	 further	assumed	 that	 said	appropriation	 is	 significantly	additive,	 i.e.	 the	more	veto	players	 in	 the	 system,	 the	more	 capital	 they	need	 to	 support	 their	political	legitimation.			
3	Quantitative	empirical	research		The	basic	idea	behind	quantitative	empirical	research	introduced	in	this	chapter	was	to	verify	the	assumption	that	political	systems	differ	with	respect	to	liquid	capital	balances	held	 by	 the	 public	 sector,	 and	 that	 changes	 in	 the	 partisan	 structure	 of	 the	 political	systems	are	correlated	to	changes	in	those	capital	balances.	The	general	empirical	basis	for	 this	 research	was	 the	Database	 of	 Political	 Institutions,	 (DPI),	 as	 published	 by	 the	World	Bank	 (Beck	 et	 al	 200144;	 Keefer	 201245).	 The	DPI	was	 the	 background,	 against	which	 fiscal,	 and	 macroeconomic	 data	 was	 projected,	 mostly	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	World	Economic	Outlook	database	(WEO),	as	published	by	the	 International	Monetary	Fund	in	April	2015.	A	sample	of	countries	has	been	selected	so	as	to	cover	a	broad	range	of	 cases,	 besides	 just	 the	developed	economies.	The	 sample	 consisted	of	77	 countries,	the	 list	 of	which,	 in	 a	 structured	 form,	 is	 given	 in	 the	Appendix	 (Table	 1).	 Due	 to	 the	limitations	of	 that	database,	 the	general	 span	of	observation	covered	 the	years	1980	 -	201246.		
3.1. Classification of political systems 	The	 first,	 somehow	 preliminary	 step	 of	 empirical	 research	 was	 to	 establish	 a	classification	 of	 political	 systems,	 according	 to	 the	 previously	 introduced,	 theoretical	distinctions.	 The	 classification	 of	 political	 systems	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 present	research	 starts	with	 the	 constitutional	 approach,	 and	 follows	 into	 the	partisan	one.	 In	order	to	represent	the	basic	constitutional	structure	of	political	systems,	two	variables	have	been	selected	in	the	rich	structure	of	the	Database	of	Political	Systems.	The	first	is	the	 type	 of	 political	 system	 according	 to	 the	 presence	 and	 powers	 of	 the	 president,	
																																																								
44 Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., 2001, New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 165–176 
45 Keefer, P., 2012, Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions, Development Research Group The 
World Bank, December 2012 
46 The general pattern of presentation in this paper is that the quantitative results in tabular form are grouped in the Appendix, at the end of 
the document. 
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coded	 in	 the	 DPI	 as	 ‘system’.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 type	 of	 electoral	 competitiveness	 in	parliamentary	elections,	covered	by	the	variables	‘plurality’,	and	‘proportionality’	in	the	DPI.		The	 distinction	 between	 presidential	 systems,	 and	 the	 parliamentary	 ones	 takes	 into	account	two	main	categories	of	veto	players:	institutional,	and	partisan.	In	other	words,	veto	players	can	emerge	and	change	their	relative	impact	upon	the	system	following	to	patterns:	 the	 regulatory,	 constitutional	 definition	 of	 their	 role,	 and	 the	 discretionary	freedom	of	political	action	offered	by	that	role.	In	presidential	systems,	the	president	is	a	strong	 veto	 player,	 and	 tends	 to	 concentrate	 power	 in	 their	 hands.	 Conversely,	parliamentary	systems	are	based	on	diversified	and	dispersed	political	power,	without	that	 one	 central	 veto	player	 in	 the	presidential	 seat.	 Systems	with	 assembly	 –	 elected	presidents	are	an	interesting	hybrid	of	the	two,	probably	prone	to	balance	towards	the	concentration,	or	the	dispersion	of	political	power,	following	the	personal	talents	of	the	president	in	place.			The	general	assumption	 is	 that	regimes	with	a	strong	component	of	electoral	plurality	favour	“winner-takes-it-all”	elections.	This,	in	turn,	promotes	the	interests	of	big,	strong	political	 parties,	 making	 them	 strong	 veto	 players,	 and	 reduces	 the	 veto	 playing	positions	 of	 small	 parties.	 In	 other	words,	 plural	 electoral	 regimes	 tend	 to	 reduce	 the	overall	number	of	partisan	veto	players,	but	they	confer	important	impact	to	the	players	who	manage	to	enter	the	scene.	On	the	other	hand,	proportionality	in	elections	allows	a	broader	representation	of	small	political	parties	and	non-partisan	representatives	in	the	legislative	body.	That	creates	more	veto	players	with	more	disparate	political	power.		As	for	the	partisan	structure	of	the	political	system,	the	most	general	variable	in	the	DPI	seems	 to	 be	 political	 polarization,	 more	 specifically:	 POLARIZ,	 and	 POLARIZ_STRICT.	They	 are	 compound	 variables,	 based	 partly	 competitiveness	 in	 the	 appointment	 of	legislators	and	executives	of	the	government	(variables:	LIEC	and	EIEC),	and	partly	upon	the	maximum	difference	between	the	chief	executive’s	party’s	value	(EXECRLC)	and	the	values	 of	 the	 three	 largest	 government	 parties	 and	 the	 largest	 opposition	 party.	 The	latter	valuation	 is	made	on	 the	grounds	of	 the	basic	distinction	of	economic	programs	into:	 conservative,	 Christian	 democratic,	 communist,	 socialist,	 social	 democratic,	 and	centrist.	We	have	POLARIZ	=	0,	when	the	democratic	competitiveness	is	below	a	critical	level,	as	well	as	when	the	ruling	party	does	not	focus	on	economic	issues	or	when	there	
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is	no	clear	 information.	Otherwise,	and	according	 to	doctrinal	differences,	 the	variable	can	take	the	value	of	1	or	2.		The	detailed	composition	of	the	sample	of	observations	studied	is	given	in	the	Appendix	(Table	 2).	 Here,	 a	 few	 general	 comments	 on	 that	 structure	 seem	 pertinent	 before	passing	to	properly	spoken	quantitative	analysis.	Just	as	in	the	full	contents	of	the	DPI,	the	 sample	 studied	 is	 dominated	 by	 three	 big	 clusters:	 plural	 electoral	 regimes	 in	presidential	 systems	 with	 no	 observable	 polarization	 (N	 =	 233	 observations),	 plural	electoral	regimes	in	parliamentary	systems,	with	no	observable	polarization	as	well	(N	=	205),	 and	 strongly	 polarized,	 parliamentary	 systems	with	 proportional	 elections	 (N	 =	213).	 This	 clustering	 suggests	 that	 plural	 electoral	 regimes	 favour	 the	 formation	 of	partisan	 structures	 around	 groups	 of	 interest	 rather	 that	 around	 ideological	 stances.	That	 appears	 as	 a	 logical	 consequence	 of	 the	 “winner-takes-it-all”	 principle	 in	 plural	elections,	 which	 favours	 big	 electoral	 funds	 and	 robust	 campaigns,	 and	 clearly	discourages	ideological	discords.	Those	observable	clusters	are	an	indication	for	further	quantitative	 analysis,	 to	 consider	 those	 three	 clusters	 as	 three	 dominant	 types	 of	political	systems.		Constitutional	orders	with	assembly	–	elected	presidents	are	very	feebly	represented	in	the	sample:	57	observations	across	both	electoral	regimes	and	all	the	possible	cases	of	partisan	polarization.	Hence,	this	category	can	be	treated	rather	as	an	exception	that	an	important	 case.	 Still,	 an	 interesting	 pattern	 emerges	 systems	with	 assembly	 –	 elected	presidents,	 namely	 the	 absence	 of	 moderately	 polarized	 partisan	 structures.	 This	particular	 class	 of	 political	 systems	 displays	 either	 no	 polarization	 at	 all,	 or	 a	 very	pronounced	 one.	 Thirdly,	 and	 this	 seems	 the	most	 important	 for	 predictive	 purposes,	countries	 studied	 tend	 to	 stay	 quite	 firmly	within	 one	pattern	 of	 constitutional	 order,	over	 the	 period	 of	 observation,	 yet	 they	 frequently	 move	 between	 various	 cases	 of	partisan	polarization.	Thus,	it	confirms	one	of	the	theoretical	intuitions	expressed	in	the	introduction,	 namely	 that	 predicting	 the	 fiscal	 function	 of	 partisan	political	 structures	might	 have	 a	 greater	 practical	 value	 that	 the	 prediction	 of	 outcomes	 brought	 by	constitutional	changes.					
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3.2. Political systems and basic fiscal aggregates 	The	 next	 step	 of	 empirical	 investigation	was	 to	 follow	 the	 disparities	 of	 typical	 fiscal	aggregates	 across	 political	 systems.	 Fiscal	 aggregates	 have	 been	 divided	 into	 two	categories,	 namely	 current	 and	 capital,	 following	 the	 basic	 intuitions	 of	 the	 present	research.	 The	 structural	 fiscal	 balance,	 gross	 public	 revenues,	 and	 gross	 public	expenditures	 are	 classified	 as	 current	 aggregates,	 i.e.	 rather	 flows	 than	 balances.	Conversely,	gross	and	net	public	debt	is	considered	as	capital	measures	(balances	rather	than	flows).	The	differential	between	gross	and	net	debt,	namely	the	amount	of	financial	assets	held	by	the	public	sector,	is	included	in	this	category	too47.			As	 for	 gross	 public	 revenues,	 parliamentary	 systems	 are	 clearly	 tax-greedier	 than	 the	presidential	ones	(Table	3,	Appendix).	They	also	seem	much	more	sensitive	to	political	polarization:	 any	 increase	 in	 that	 respect	 is	 connected	 to	 significantly	 higher	 public	revenues.	 Gross	 public	 expenditures	 follow	 a	 similar	 pattern,	 and	 yet,	 within	 each	constitutional	order,	they	seem	much	more	sensitive	than	revenues	to	shifts	in	political	polarization.	The	observation	of	structural	fiscal	balances	seems	to	indicate	that	the	shift	from	 no	 observable	 polarization	 to	 moderate	 one	 has	 more	 impact	 than	 a	 further	deepening	of	polarization	from	moderate	to	high.		Variables	referring	to	capital	accruals	in	the	public	sector	display	a	significantly	greater	disparity	across	political	systems	than	current	flows	do.	In	other	words,	the	empirically	observable	 differences	 between	 political	 systems	 as	 for	 their	 patterns	 of	 capital	appropriation	 are	 noticeably	 more	 pronounced	 than	 differences	 referring	 to	 current	fiscal	 management.	 It	 proves	 that	 the	 central	 assumption	 of	 the	 present	 paper	 is	 a	material,	real	distinction	worth	further	research	(Table	4,	Appendix).		Following	 the	 observable	 clustering	 of	 political	 systems	 in	 the	 sample	 studies,	 three	“big”	types	are	defined	for	the	purposes	of	further	empirical	investigation.	They	are:	a) Cluster	 #1:	 Presidential	 systems	 with	 plural	 elections,	 and	 no	 observable	political	 polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -2,651%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	indebtedness	 55,186%	 of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	9,151%	of	the	GDP		
																																																								
47 The author is aware of the conceptual risk connected to that variable. Those financial assets include, for a large part, those held by central 
banks as monetary reserves. Thus, this could be a monetary variable rather that a fiscal one. Yet, the amount of those financial assets in 
public hands is not exclusively monetary, in the first place, and, secondly, it impacts significantly the fiscal, borrowing capacity of the 
government. Hence, this is a variable at the fringe of fiscal policy, and the rest of the economy.  
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b) Cluster	 #2:	 Parliamentary	 systems	 with	 plural	 elections,	 and	 no	 observable	political	 polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -3,643%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	indebtedness	 70,739%	 of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	23,165%	of	the	GDP	c) Cluster	#3:	Parliamentary	systems	with	proportional	elections	and	high	political	polarization:	 structural	 balance	 	 -3,089%	 of	 GDP,	 gross	 public	 indebtedness	62,025%	of	 the	 GDP,	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	 46,771%	of	 the	GDP					The	definition	of	 those	3	 clusters	 shows	 even	more	 sharply	 the	 explanatory	power	of	capital	 appropriation	 as	 a	 characteristic	 of	 political	 systems.	 The	 interesting,	 general	observation	is	that	cluster	#1,	which	hosts	the	least	veto	players	in	the	system,	seems	to	be	the	most	frugal	in	fiscal	terms,	both	with	respect	to	current	fiscal	management,	and	to	capital	 appropriation.	 Any	 shift	 from	 this	 cluster,	 thus	 any	 addition	 of	 veto	 players,	through	 constitutional	 rules	 or	 partisan	 polarization,	 is	 clearly	 associated	 to	 more	profusion	 in	 fiscal	 stances.	 Considering	 constitutional	 and	 partisan	 distinctions	 as	 an	overall	 indicator	of	the	number	of	veto	players	in	the	system,	we	can	roughly	consider	clusters	#1,	and	#3	as	the	opposite	poles	of	the	scale,	with	cluster	#2	found	somewhere	in	the	middle.	Cluster	#1	has	probably	the	least	veto	players,	cluster	#3	has	the	most	of	them,	and	cluster	#2	 is	 a	medium	case.	Following	 this	 intuition,	 the	presence	of	more	veto	players	in	the	political	system	is	associated	most	of	all	to	a	much	greater	tendency	of	the	public	sector	to	accumulate	liquid	financial	assets.		
3.3. Socio-economic outcomes of fiscal policies 	The	 next	 step	 in	 empirical	 research	 was	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 fiscal	 policies	 upon	selected	 socio-economic	 phenomena,	 in	 different	 political	 systems.	 The	phenomena	 in	question	are:	a)	the	accumulation	of	private	savings	b)	the	allocation	of	said	savings	in	productive	 assets	 (gross	 investment)	 c)	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 labour	market,	 and	more	specifically	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 so-called	 vulnerable	 employment	 d)	 primary	completion	 rate	 in	 the	 educational	 system.	 Five	 explanatory	 variables	 have	 been	selected	 to	 be	 included	 in	 a	 linear,	 multiple	 regression	model,	 namely:	 the	 structural	fiscal	 balance,	 gross	 public	 debt 48 ,	 the	 amount	 of	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the																																																									
48 Preemptive, econometric tests showed that gross public debt and net public debt are mutually redundant in this regression. One of these 
two had to be selected, and the choice was gross public debt. It shows the total amount of capital transferred to the public sector of a country 
with the help of obligatory contracts.  
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government,	gross	public	revenues,	and	gross	public	expenditures.	Each	of	the	explained	variables	 has	 been	 regressed	 on	 the	 explanatory	 ones	 through	 the	 Ordinary	 Least	Squares	method.	Standardized	values	of	all	the	variables	have	been	used,	to	provide	for	non-stationary	trends.	As	for	all	the	outcome	variables,	a	constant	residual	was	assumed	to	exist.	The	software	used	for	statistical	computations	was	Wizard	for	Mac	OS.	For	each	outcome	variable,	 the	results	of	regression	 in	the	general	sample	were	compared	with	the	three	clusters	identified	in	the	previous	subchapters49.		In	the	general	sample	(N	=	721),	the	formation	of	gross	national	savings	(as	defined	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund)	in	the	private	sector	is	under	a	significant	influence	of	fiscal	 variables.	 The	 constant	 residual	 is	 negative:	 without	 the	 crowding	 out	 effect	 of	fiscal	 policies,	 savings	would	 display	 a	 downward	 trend.	 There	 is	 a	 clear,	 and	mostly	positive	link	between	the	expansion	of	fiscal	aggregates	and	the	accumulation	of	private	wealth.	Two	interesting	phenomena	are	to	notice.	Firstly,	among	all	the	fiscal	aggregates	taken	into	account	the	structural	balance	is	the	only	one	to	display	rather	a	weak	link	to	the	formation	of	private	savings.	Secondly,	gross	public	revenues	are	positively	linked	to	private	 savings,	 whilst	 public	 expenditures	 display	 a	 negative	 link.	 In	 other	 words,	taxation	seems	to	be	positively	linked	to	private	wealth,	whilst	public	expenditures	are	rather	a	substitute	to	private	accumulation.		As	 the	 same	 regression	 is	 run	 in	 sub-samples	 defined	 according	 to	 the	 previously	adopted	 classification	 of	 political	 systems,	 one	 central	 observation	 is	 to	 note:	 the	strength	 of	 the	 econometric	 connection	 increases,	 both	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 overall	 R2	accuracy,	and	as	for	the	t	Student	significance	in	particular	variables.	The	link	between	fiscal	 policies	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 private	 savings	 seem	 to	 be	 system–specific.	Interestingly,	 the	 overall	 explanatory	 power	 of	 fiscal	 variables	 grows	 as	 the	 cluster	studied	moves	towards	a	greater	number	of	veto	players.	A	pattern	emerges:	the	more	veto	 players	 in	 the	 political	 system,	 the	 greater	 the	 impact	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 upon	 the	formation	of	savings.		As	 the	 present	 research	 is	 very	much	 oriented	 on	 capital	 appropriation	 in	 the	 public	sector,	gross	public	debt	and	financial	assets	held	by	the	public	sector	deserve	a	closer	look	 as	 explanatory	 factors.	 In	 the	 general	 sample,	 both	 have	 positive	 impact	 upon	private	 savings.	 The	 influence	 of	 gross	 public	 debt	 seems	 relatively	 weak,	 while	 the	accumulation	of	 financial	 assets	 by	public	 agents	 is	 a	 strongly	positive	 and	 significant																																																									
49 Detailed results of regression tests are presented in tables 5 – 8, in the Appendix. 
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factor.	When	 split	 into	 the	 three	 clusters,	 the	 same	 regression	 shows	 really	 disparate	results.	 In	 the	 clusters	 #1	 and	 #2,	 gross	 public	 debt	 seems	 to	 be	 rather	 a	 disturbing	factor	 regarding	 private	 savings,	 whilst	 in	 the	 cluster	 #3	 it	 is	 strongly	 and	 positively	correlated.	The	accumulation	of	financial	assets	in	the	public	sector	changes	its	 impact	upon	private	savings	from	cluster	to	cluster	as	well.				As	we	pass	 form	 the	 formation	of	private	 capital	 to	 its	 allocation	 in	productive	 assets	through	 investment,	 the	 first	 salient	 observation	 is	 the	 generally	 lower	 explanatory	power	of	 fiscal	variables.	 Just	as	 in	the	case	of	private	savings,	 that	explanatory	power	grows	as	we	plunge	into	particular	clusters	of	political	systems.	Once	more,	a	system	–	specific	response	to	fiscal	policy	is	to	notice.	In	clusters	#1	and	#2,	fiscal	variables	seem	to	 be	 mostly	 a	 disturbing	 factor	 to	 private	 investment,	 whilst	 in	 the	 cluster	 #3	 the	relationship	 seems	 to	 be	 more	 stable.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 more	 veto	 players	 in	 the	political	 system,	 the	 more	 predictable	 the	 impact	 of	 fiscal	 policies	 upon	 private	investment.		The	 primary	 completion	 rate	 is	 probably	 the	 most	 “social”	 and	 the	 least	 “economic”	among	 the	 four	 outcome	 variables	 studied	 in	 this	 subchapter.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 least	explained	by	 fiscal	variables	 in	 the	general	sample.	With	an	R2	equal	 to	0,041,	 there	 is	hardly	 any	 connection.	 Still,	 when	 going	 into	 specific	 clusters,	 the	 correlation	significantly	 gains	 in	 robustness,	 and	 each	 cluster	 displays	 a	 different	 pattern	 of	correlation.	Just	as	in	the	case	of	private	savings,	as	we	move	from	cluster	#1	to	#3,	thus	as	we	add	veto	players	in	the	system,	the	explanatory	power	of	fiscal	factors	grows.			The	 rate	 of	 vulnerable	 employment	 is	 astride	 the	 social	 and	 the	 purely	 economic	outcomes	 of	 fiscal	 policies.	 In	 the	 general	 sample,	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 fiscal	variables	 is	 pretty	 strong.	 Differently	 from	 the	 previous	 outcomes	 under	 scrutiny,	transferring	 the	 analysis	 to	 specific	 clusters	 does	 not	 unequivocally	 increase	 that	explanatory	 power.	 Only	 the	 cluster	 #3	 displays	 stronger	 correlation	 that	 the	 general	sample.	Still,	one	can	notice	the	same	phenomenon	of	the	explanatory	power	gaining	in	strength,	as	more	veto	players	are	present	in	the	system.					
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4	Case	studies			The	 empirical	 part	 of	 the	present	 research	 covers	 a	 qualitative	part	 too.	 It	 consists	 of	case	 studies	 connected	 to	 the	 previously	 signalled	 identity	 of	 three	 big	 clusters	 of	political	 systems.	 The	 goal	 of	 the	 present	 study	 is	 contributing	 to	 the	 prediction	 of	changes	in	fiscal	policies	that	can	possibly	come	out	of	changes	in	the	partisan	structure	of	 the	political	 system.	Cases	under	 scrutiny	are	 countries,	which	migrated	 to	or	 from	any	of	the	three	clusters,	during	the	period	of	observation.	The	choice	of	cases	was	quite	intuitive,	 and	 the	 general	 purpose	 was	 to	 go	 more	 in	 depth	 of	 the	 general	 patterns	observed	 in	 quantitative	 research.	 The	 first	 interesting	 case	 is	 Bolivia	 (see	 table	 9,	Appenix).	According	to	the	here-adopted	classification	of	political	systems,	the	country	ended	 up	 in	 the	 cluster	 #1,	 yet	 it	 was	 its	 end	 of	 the	 road,	 so	 to	 say.	 The	 span	 of	observation	 as	 for	 this	 particular	 country	 ranged	 from	 2000	 through	 2012.	Constitutionally,	Bolivia	had	been	a	presidential	 system	with	plural	 elections	over	 the	whole	period	studied.	At	the	beginning	of	 the	observation	span,	 the	political	system	of	Bolivia	was	a	case	of	recently	implemented	democratic	reforms,	mostly	referring	to	the	electoral	system	(Van	Cott	200050;	Arnold	200451;	Laserna	200952).	Still,	some	authors	argue	 that	 social	 inequalities	 and	 the	 resulting	underrepresentation	of	 large	 and	poor	social	 groups,	made	 those	 reforms	 technical	 rather	 than	 fundamental	 (O’Donnell	 et	 al.	200453).	Exactly	in	the	middle	of	the	observation	span,	the	country	went	through	deep	political	change,	with	 the	advent	 in	office	of	 the	president	Evo	Morales,	 in	2006.	Since	then,	some	authors	call	Bolivia	“the	 first	post	neoliberal	democracy	 in	the	world”,	or	a	“new	 socialism”	 (Kohl,	 201054).	 In	 2009,	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 country	was	 changed,	with	 an	 important	 reform	of	 land	property,	 and	 land	management,	 inclusive	 of	 a	 new	policy	 as	 for	 hydrocarbons	 (Postero,	 201055).	 As	 for	 the	 political	 system,	 the	 new	constitution	claimed	to	implement	a	new	form	of	democracy,	strongly	participatory,	and	
																																																								
50 Van Cott, D., 2000, The Liquidation of the Past. The Politics of Diversity in Latin America, USA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press  
51 Arnold, D., 2004, Pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia. Hacia su soberanía y legitimidad electoral, Bolivia: Corte 
Nacional Electoral  
52 Laserna, R., 2009, Decentralization, Local Initiatives, and Citizenship in Bolivia, 1994- 2004, in: Selee, Andrew, and 
Enrique Peruzzotti (eds.), Participatory Innovation and Reprsentative Democracy in Latin America, Washington: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press  
53 O ́Donnell, G., Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo Iazzetta. 2004, The Quality of Democracy. Theory and Applications, Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame Press  
54 Kohl, B., 2010, Bolivia under Morales: A Work in Progress, Latin American Perspectives, 37, pp. 107-122  
55 Postero, N., 2010, The struggle to create a radical democracy in Bolivia, Latin American Research Review, 45, pp. 59-78  
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communitarian	 (Schilling-Vacaflor	 2010 56 ).	 Here	 comes	 the	 first	 interesting	contradiction:	the	Database	of	Political	Institutions	indicates	that	over	the	years	2000	–	2002	Bolivia	displayed	high	political	polarization	(POLARIZ	=	2),	to	pass	into	the	zone	of	moderate	polarization	(POLARIZ	=	1)	from	2003	through	2005,	and	from	2006	on	ended	up	 in	 cluster	#1,	with	 no	 observable	 polarization.	 Thus,	 one	 body	 of	 literature	 allows	assuming	 that	 the	 number	 of	 partisan	 veto	 players	 had	 increased	 since	 2006,	 whilst	other	authors	suggest	just	the	contrary.		As	for	current	fiscal	flows,	both	public	expenditures	and	public	revenues	increased	their	share	 in	 the	 GDP	 over	 the	 period	 studied57.	 Unfortunately,	 data	 about	 the	 structural	balance	 is	 not	 available,	 yet	 expenditures	 and	 revenues	 allow	 calculating	 the	 primary	fiscal	 balance,	 which	 had	 passed	 from	 a	 dangerously	 deep	 deficit	 between	 2000	 and	2005	 to	 a	 significant,	 yet	 hesitating	 surplus	 from	 2006	 on.	 Both	 gross	 and	 net	 public	debt	 had	 been	 quickly	 growing	 between	 2000	 and	 2005,	 to	 start	 falling	 sharply	afterwards.	 Intriguingly,	 the	 amount	 of	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	 sector	 had	been	 growing	 over	 the	 whole	 period	 studied,	 still	 since	 2006	 that	 growth	 was	 truly	spectacular.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	this	particular	fiscal	variable	follows	the	clearest	trend	among	all	the	here-adopted	descriptors	of	fiscal	stance.	Gross	national	savings	followed	almost	just	as	spectacular	a	growth,	as	that	of	financial	assets	held	by	the	public	sector.	Interestingly,	the	rate	of	vulnerable	employment	displays	an	overall	downward	trend	to	amelioration.	As	for	the	investment	rate,	it	dropped	between	2000	and	2005,	to	recover	afterwards.				The	case	of	Bolivia	presents	interesting	contradictions.	On	the	one	hand,	we	can	observe	sudden,	and	controversial,	political	changes,	which	find	their	expression	in	some	of	the	fiscal	variables.	On	the	other	hand,	Bolivian	economy	goes	through	a	process	of	steady	accumulation	of	capital	both	in	private	hands,	and	the	public	sector.	That	process	seems	to	be	much	steadier	than	other	fiscal	and	political	changes.	One	can	intuitively	guess	of	capital	accumulation,	under	the	stirring	surface.	
United	 States	 (Table	10,	Appendix)	are	the	biggest	economy	in	the	world,	and	for	the	most	part	of	 their	observation	span,	namely	since	2001	through	2010	remained	in	the	cluster	#1,	to	move	to	high	polarization	for	the	two	remaining	years	studied.	The	fiscal	stance	of	 the	U.S.	 over	 that	period	 is	 a	deepening	negative,	 structural	balance,	quickly																																																									
56 Schilling-Vacaflor, A., 2010, Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory Democracy and Political Pluralism?, GIGA Research 
Programme: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems, Working Paper no. 141  
57 A separate table in the Appendix presents quantitative data about Bolivia.  
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accumulating	 public	 debt,	 shrinking	 public	 revenues	 and	 growing	 expenditures.	Interestingly,	the	wedge	between	gross	and	net	public	debt	(or	financial	assets	held	by	the	 government),	 had	 been	 growing	 steadily	 between	 2001	 and	 2012,	 which	 was	accompanied	by	a	substantial	decrease	in	the	rate	of	private	savings,	and	that	of	private	investment.	 Data	 about	 vulnerable	 employment	 is	 not	 available,	 and	 one	 can	 notice	 a	significant	decrease	as	for	the	primary	completion	rate.	Summing	up,	from	2001	through	2012	 the	United	States	were	an	economy	 in	 trouble,	with	a	worsening	 fiscal	 stance.	A	few	interesting	questions	emerge.	Firstly,	was	the	passage	to	higher	polarization	in	the	matters	 of	 economic	 policy	 (POLARIZ	 shifting	 from	 0	 to	 2)	 rather	 the	 driver	 of	 fiscal	changes,	 or	 the	 driven	 one?	 Both	 the	 growing	 public	 indebtedness,	 and	 the	 growing	amount	 of	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 government	 allow	 guessing	 quick	 capital	accumulation	in	the	public	sector.	Was	it	just	lax	fiscal	policy,	or	did	that	mean	that	new	partisan	veto	players	were	progressively	coming	into	the	political	game	and	they	needed	some	financial	space	for	themselves?	An	immediate	comparison	with	the	preceding	case	of	Bolivia	 reveals	an	 interesting	dualism,	 right	 in	 the	 spirit	of	 John	Stuart	Mill	 and	his	canons	 of	 logic:	 those	 two	 countries	 differ	 in	 practically	 every	 respect	 as	 for	 the	variables	 studied,	 excepted	 two.	 They	 both	 witnessed	 a	 change	 in	 the	 structure	 of	partisan	veto	players,	and	both	accumulated	more	financial	assets	 in	the	public	sector.	The	change	in	political	polarization	was	of	opposite	direction	in	each	case	(Bolivia	2	to	0;	 the	U.S.	0	to	2),	still	a	change	there	was.	As	case	studies	allow	heuristic	 inference,	a	heuristic	 hypothesis	 can	 be	 formulated,	 namely	 that	 any	 change	 in	 the	 structure	 of	partisan	veto	players	 in	the	political	system	is	connected	to	 increased	accumulation	of	capital	in	the	public	sector,	whatever	the	vector	of	change.					
Mexico	(Table	11,	Appendix),	geographically	between	Bolivia,	and	the	United	States,	is	an	 interesting	 case	 of	 oscillatory	 changes	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 variables	 investigated.	Within	 its	 interval	of	observation,	namely	 from	1998	 through	2012,	Mexico	 started	 in	the	cluster	#1,	left	it	quite	quickly	to	move	towards	higher	political	polarization,	but	the	movement	 was	 a	 wave	 rather	 than	 a	 trend.	 Over	 the	 period	 2001-	 2009,	 political	polarization	passed	from	non-existent	(POLARIZ	=	0),	through	moderate	to	high,	just	to	return	to	moderate	from	2010	on.	That	political	oscillation	was	accompanied,	roughly	in	step,	by	a	wavy	change	in	capital	fiscal	variables	(gross	debt,	net	debt,	financial	assets),	as	well	 as	 that	 of	 the	 structural	 balanced.	 An	 unequivocally	 growing	 share	 of	 current	fiscal	 flows	 in	 the	 GDP	 was	 to	 observe,	 as	 well	 as	 worsening	 ratios	 of	 savings	 and	
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investment.	 Interestingly,	 the	 social	 situation	 seems	 to	 have	 had	 improved,	 as	 seen	through	 the	 double	 lens	 of	 primary	 completion	 rate,	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 vulnerable	employment.	 In	 general,	 growing	 political	 polarization	was	 accompanied	 by	 shrinking	indebtedness,	both	in	gross	and	net	terms,	and	by	a	growing	amount	of	financial	assets	held	 by	 the	 government.	 It	 looks	 as	 if	 growing	political	 polarization	 in	 this	 case	went	together	with	the	building	–	up	of	borrowing	capacity	from	the	part	of	the	public	sector.				As	cases	from	the	cluster	#1	are	studied,	Poland	(Table	12,	Appendix)	is	an	interesting	one:	it	is	a	case	of	truly	high,	structural	instability	of	the	political	system	with	respect	to	the	 variables	 studied.	 Over	 its	 interval	 of	 observation,	 namely	 1995	 –	 2012,	 Poland	jumped	 between	 the	 cluster	 #1	 and	 other	 groups	 of	 political	 systems,	 inclusive	 of	changes	 in	 the	 electoral	 regime,	 coming	 and	 going	 between	 plurality	 and	proportionality.	 At	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 span	 of	 observation,	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	Poland	had	virtually	no	net	public	debt,	and	an	extremely	inflated	pool	of	financial	assets	held	by	the	public	sector,	in	the	presence	of	substantial	gross	public	indebtedness.	Since	then,	gross	public	 indebtedness	had	slightly	grown,	which	took	place	against	a	quickly	growing	 net	 indebtedness,	 and	 an	 overall	 decreasing	 trend	 in	 the	 amount	 if	 financial	assets	in	the	public	sector.	One	can	also	observe	steady	decrease	in	the	share	of	current	fiscal	flows	in	the	GDP.	The	rate	of	private	savings	had,	on	the	whole,	decreased,	whilst	private	 investment	 climbed	 slightly.	 On	 the	 social	 side,	 we	 can	 observe	 a	 steady	improvement	 both	 as	 for	 the	 primary	 completion	 rate,	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 vulnerable	employment.	 Change	 in	political	 polarization	 seem	 to	have	been	 the	most	 reflected	 in	the	oscillation	of	gross	public	 indebtedness,	and	the	amount	of	 financial	assets	held	 in	the	 public	 sector:	 both	 tend	 to	 be	 lower	 in	 the	 times	 of	 lower	 polarization,	 and	 to	increase	 with	 higher	 polarization.	 Poland	 is	 a	 case	 of	 the	 overall	 steady	 economic	change,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 slight	 oscillations	 of	 capital	 fiscal	 variables,	 seemingly	connected	to	variations	in	political	fragmentation.	The	steady,	long-term	change	seems	to	 be	 attached	 to	 an	 outflow	 of	 capital	 from	 the	 public	 sector.	 Characteristically,	 that	outflow	came	along	with	visible	social	improvement.		With	the	case	of	New	Zealand	(Table	13,	Appendix),	we	pass	to	countries	grouped	in	the	cluster	#2:	parliamentary	systems	with	prevailing	plurality	in	the	electoral	regime,	and	no	 observable	 political	 polarization	 as	 for	 the	 key	 aspects	 of	 economic	 policy.	 More	specifically,	New	Zealand	remained	in	the	cluster	#2	from	1985	through	1994,	to	leave	it	for	good	since	then	and	to	pass	to	high	polarization.	Over	the	whole	span	of	observation,	
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New	Zealand	went	through	a	deep	change	in	public	governance,	and	a	substantial	part	of	that	change	regarded	specifically	 the	 fiscal	policy.	 Interestingly	enough,	observation	of	New	Zealand	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	research	starts	at	the	very	moment	when	important	 public	 reforms	 began.	 The	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Public	 Finance	 Act	 1989	seems	to	have	been	a	milestone	in	the	process,	introducing	a	novelty	at	the	global	scale,	namely	passing	from	cash-based	budgetary	management	to	the	accrual-based	one	(see	for	example:	Goldman,	Brashares	199158).	In	New	Zealand,	the	purpose	of	the	systemic	change	 was	 to	 minimize	 consistently	 the	 budgetary	 slack.	 As	 the	 DPI	 data	 shows,	 as	those	 public	 reforms	 had	 been	 implemented,	 from	 1985	 to	 1994,	 no	 political	polarization	 as	 for	 economic	 policy	 was	 observable	 (POLARIZ	 =	 0).	 From	 1995	 on,	polarization	 jumped	 to	 “high”	 (POLARIZ	 =	 2)	 and	 remained	 such	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	period	observed,	through	2012.		Quantitative	 fiscal	 data	 about	 New	 Zealand,	 collected	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 present	research,	 shows	 clearly	 that	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 public	 reforms	 the	 public	 sector	was	quite	 greedy,	 holding	 over	 24%	of	 the	 GDP	 in	 liquid	 financial	 assets,	 and	 recording	 a	significant	 gross,	 and	 net	 debt.	 From	 1985	 (when	 our	 span	 of	 observation	 starts)	through	 1989	 (when	 the	 Public	 Finance	 Act	 1989	 was	 voted),	 the	 share	 of	 public,	financial	assets	in	the	GDP	shrank	significantly,	and	the	structural	balance	improved.	It	was	 probably	 the	 most	 immediate	 result	 of	 passing	 from	 cash-based	 budgetary	accounting	to	the	accrual	based	one.	That	transition	probably	terminated	a	lot	of	small	capital	pockets	held	by	public	agents	through	the	postponement	of	cash	settlements.	The	spectacular	 deflation	 of	 public	 financial	 assets,	 and	 the	 betterment	 of	 the	 structural	balance	are	 the	most	striking	 fiscal	 changes	accompanying	 the	reforms.	Later	on,	over	the	next	15	years,	public	debt	decreased	significantly	both	in	gross	and	net	terms.	Public	financial	assets	inflated	again	after	2004,	just	as	public	debt,	not	to	the	previous	levels,	though.	Interestingly	enough,	private	capital	aggregates,	namely	saving	and	investment	had	 been	 changing	 in	 close	 correlation	with	 the	 public	 ones.	 In	 general,	 2003	 –	 2004	seem	 to	 be	 the	 moment,	 when	 fiscal	 reforms	 reached	 some	 kind	 of	 peak	 in	 their	quantitative	outcomes.	Afterwards,	the	fiscal	stance	started	to	revert.		Hence,	 the	 following	picture	emerges.	 In	 the	1980s,	 the	political	 system	reached	some	kind	of	general	agreement	about	 the	economic	policy	 to	 follow,	which	 reflected	 in	 the																																																									
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Finance, vol.11(4), pp.75­85  
 
	 26	
absence	of	political	polarization,	and	in	bold	constitutional	reforms.	The	state	of	partisan	unanimity	had	lasted	until	1994,	when	significant	disparities	in	economic	programmes	appeared.	 The	 striking	 fact	 is	 that	 the	 beginning	 of	 significant	 political	 polarization	coincided	almost	perfectly	with	the	first	official	publication	of	the	government’s	balance	sheet	(Dale,	Ball	199659).		The	case	of	New	Zealand	rouses	a	few	interesting	remarks.	Was	it	the	process	of	public	reforms	 that	 triggered	 the	 first	 visible	 fiscal	 change,	 namely	 the	 improvement	 in	structural	balance	and	 the	deflation	of	public	 financial	assets,	or	was	 it	 the	absence	of	political	 polarization?	 Which	 factor	 was	 decisive:	 the	 legal	 change,	 or	 the	 partisan	structure	 of	 the	 political	 system?	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 why	 did	 the	 private	 capital	aggregates	 change	 in	 such	 a	 close	 correlation	 with	 the	 public	 ones?	 What	 was	 the	connection?	Now,	we	pass	to	some	countries	included	into	Cluster	#3:	parliamentary	systems	with	proportional	 elections	 and	 high	 political	 polarization.	 Two	 cases	 seem	 particularly	interesting:	 Finland,	 and	 Israel.	 Finland	 (Table	 14,	 Appendix),	 is	 some	 kind	 of	 fiscal	champion	 in	 the	 sample	 studied,	 along	with	 other	 Nordic	 countries.	 Observed,	 in	 the	sample,	since	1980	through	2012,	Finland	maintains	a	positive	fiscal	balance,	both	at	the	primary,	 and	 at	 the	 structural	 level.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 combines	 all	 the	 factors	 of	political	 fragmentation,	 both	 constitutional	 and	partisan.	Thus,	 it	 is	 a	 living	proof	 that	strongly	differentiated	political	systems	can	generate	high	fiscal	discipline.	Its	reserves	of	public	financial	assets,	combined	with	a	noticeable	gross	public	debt,	and	a	net	claim	on	the	rest	of	the	world	(negative	net	debt)	call	for	the	metaphor	of	a	bank-country.	As	for	 political	 polarization,	 Finland	 jumps	 in	 to	 and	 out	 of	 cluster	 #3.	 Still,	 political	polarization	as	for	economic	policy	never	descends	below	POLARIZ	=	1,	which,	in	turn,	means	that	there	is	always	a	significant	number	of	distinct,	partisan	veto	players	in	the	political	 system.	 It	 is	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 amount	 of	 financial	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 public	sector,	 as	 well	 as	 net	 public	 debt,	 both	 change	 in	 close	 correlation	 with	 and	proportionally	to	political	polarization.	Once	more,	the	more	partisan	veto	players,	 the	more	capital	held	by	public	agents.		The	phenomenon	of	Finland	consists	in	the	fact	that	the	country	has	developed	a	whole	structure	made	of	 the	so-called	peripheral	agencies,	 i.e.	relatively	small,	and	prudently	
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endowed	 agencies	 of	 the	 government,	 in	 charge	 of	 carrying	 out	 many	 innovative	projects	 in	 the	 broadly	 spoken	 field	 of	 economic	 development.	 Those	 agencies	 are	staffed	with	people	coming	from	many	political	parties	and	fractions,	and	are	supposed	to	 bring	 together	 the	 different	 economic	 programmes	 into	 concrete,	 specific	 projects	(see	 for	 example:	 Breznitz,	 Ornston	 201360).	 Hence,	 the	 Finish	 political	 class	 has	managed	 to	 turn	 a	 curse	 into	 a	 blessing.	 The	well-known	mechanism	 of	 “my-friend’s-cousin-should-have-that-job-in-your-ministry”,	 usually	 bringing	 about	 the	 worst	 cases	of	budgetary	slack,	in	this	case	is	used	as	a	tool	for	improvement	and	development.					
Israel	 (Table	15,	Appendix),	another	country	 from	the	cluster	#3,	presents	a	different	profile.	With	the	political	system	just	as	fragmented	into	veto	players,	as	that	of	Finland,	but	very	poor	a	fiscal	stance,	Israel	presents	two	peculiarities.	Firstly,	in	the	presence	of	relatively	 high	 public	 indebtedness,	 and	 substantial	 current	 fiscal	 flows,	 the	 public	sector	of	Israel	holds	very	few	financial	assets,	and	over	the	period	of	observation	those	assets	plunged	 close	 to	null.	 Secondly,	 Israel	 is	 one	of	 the	 rare	 countries	 in	 the	whole	sample,	where	the	rate	of	savings	has	increased	over	the	period	studied,	and	the	social	situation	has	 clearly	 improved	 in	 spite	of	 the	on-going	armed	conflict.	 Israel	 seems	 to	have	 developed	 a	 network	 of	 public,	 peripheral	 agencies	 focused	 on	 economic	development,	similarly	to	Finland	(Breznitz,	Ornston	2013;	Getz,	Goldberg	201561),	thus	finding	positive	employment	for	various	partisan	veto	players.	As	compared	to	Finland,	in	 the	 same	 cluster,	 Israel	 seems	 to	have	developed	 some	 sort	 of	 capital	 transmission	from	current	fiscal	 flows	directly	 into	privately	held	assets,	without	bulking	financially	the	public	sector.					
5	Conclusion		The	present	paper	was	written	with	the	intention	to	follow	up	onto	the	path	indicated	by	the	seminal	paper	by	Roubini	and	Sachs	(1989),	namely	to	explore	the	intuition	that	the	 political	 system	 in	 place	 is	 a	 strong	 determinant	 of	 fiscal	 policy.	 Quantitative	research	 suggests	 strong,	 cross-sectional	 disparities	 between	 political	 systems	 as	 for	their	 typical	 fiscal	 stance,	 and	 those	disparities	 seem	 to	 refer	mostly	 to	 the	amount	of	capital	held	by	the	public	sector,	rather	than	to	current	fiscal	flows.	The	number	of	veto																																																									
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players	in	the	political	system,	as	possible	to	estimate	on	the	grounds	of	constitutional	rules,	and	of	political	polarization,	seems	to	be	strongly,	and	positively	correlated	with	the	 amount	 of	 liquid	 capital	 held	 in	 the	 natural	 and	 temporary	 possession	 of	 public	agents.		The	more	veto	players	in	the	political	system,	the	greater	seems	to	be	the	impact	of	fiscal	policy	 upon	 some	 socio-economic	 outcomes,	 such	 as	 the	 formation	 of	 private	 savings,	private	 investment	 or	 primary	 completion	 rate.	 Clearly,	 what	 we	 use	 to	 designate	 as	efficiency	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 is	 very	 specific	 regarding	 the	 political	 system	 in	 place.	 In	 a	broader	perspective,	the	present	paper	comes	to	a	somewhat	different	conclusion	than	the	seminal	work	by	Roubini	and	Sachs	(1989).	Whilst	these	authors	claimed	that	fiscal	discipline	 clearly	 varies	 across	 political	 systems,	 the	 present	 research	 seems	 to	 prove	that	fiscal	discipline	is	pretty	homogenous,	whilst	the	ways	that	public	agents	adopt	to	govern	 capital	 in	 their	 possession,	 and	 the	 outcomes	 of	 that	 governance,	 are	 clearly	system-specific.		On	the	other	hand,	qualitative	case	studies	allow	noticing	that	the	capital	held	by	public	agents,	estimated	mostly	as	public	debt	and	financial	assets	in	the	public	sector,	changes	over	time	in	close	correlation	with	changes	in	political	polarization.	Still,	at	the	level	of	case	 studies,	 no	 visible	 pattern	 emerges	 as	 for	 cross-sectional	 correlations	 in	 that	respect.	Any	 increase	 in	political	polarization	almost	 inevitably	 leads	 to	an	 increase	 in	public	indebtedness	and/or	the	endowment	of	public	agents	with	financial	assets,	with	decreasing	political	polarity	acting	in	the	opposite	way.	In	some	cases,	though	not	in	all	of	 them,	 that	 change	 in	 the	 appropriation	 of	 financial	 assets	 goes	 along	 with	 a	proportional	 change	 in	public	 indebtedness.	Yet,	national	political	 systems	seem	 to	be	strongly	idiosyncratic	as	for	the	exact	share	of	GDP	held	as	capital	by	public	agents.		On	 the	 whole,	 empirical	 research	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 strongly	 substantiates	 the	general	claims	of	the	pork	barrel	theory,	as	formulated	by	Weingast	and	others.	Still,	the	theory	 of	 veto	 players,	 as	 presented	 by	 Tsebelis,	 seems	 to	 add	much	 precision	 to	 the	pork	barrel	theory.		Case	studies	inspire	an	interesting	question,	namely	that	of	the	relative	strength	of	fiscal,	and	political	factors	in	the	shaping	of	public	policies	and	constitutional	orders.	Does	the	amount	 of	 capital	 appropriated	 by	 the	 public	 sector	 adapt	 to	 the	 political	 system,	 or,	conversely,	does	the	political	system	adapt	to	the	available	capital	resources?	Moreover,	is	the	fiscal	stance	of	the	government	informative	about	the	actual,	partisan	structure	of	
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the	political	system?	In	other	words,	are	substantial	shifts	in	the	amount	of	capital	held	in	the	public	sector	informative	about	the	emergence	or	disappearance	of	partisan	veto	players,	not	officially	disclosed	as	such?	Can	we	assume,	for	example,	that	some	partisan	veto	 players	 start	 appropriating	 capital	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 even	 before	 they	 have	officially	emerged	as	political	parties?					 	
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Appendix		
Table	1	Structure	of	the	sample	used	in	empirical	research,	by	country	and	number	of	year	-	observations	
Country	 Number	of	
year	-	
observations	
Country	 Number	of	
year	-	
observations	
Country	 Number	of	
year	-	
observations	Algeria	 12	 Hungary	 8	 Nigeria	 13	Australia	 24	 Iceland	 31	 Norway	 33	Austria	 25	 Ireland	 33	 Pakistan	 11	Bahrain	 23	 Iran	 17	 Panama	 10	Belgium	 33	 Israel	 13	 Peru	 13	Belize	 11	 Italy	 25	 Poland	 18	Bolivia	 13	 Japan	 33	 Portugal	 16	Bośnia	 and	Herzegovina	 15	 Jordan	 25	 Qatar	 23	Brazil	 13	 Kazachstan	 11	 Saudi	Arabia	 14	Bulgaria	 13	 Kenya	 15	 Solomon	Islands	 10	Canada	 33	 Korea	 12	 South	African	Republic	 13	Cape	Verde	 11	 Latvia	 13	 Spain	 28	Chile	 20	 Liban	 13	 Swaziland	 12	Columbia	 14	 Lesotho	 8	 Sweden	 20	Denmark	 18	 Liberia	 13	 Switzerland	 30	Egypt	 11	 Libya	 23	 Syria	 21	Estonia	 17	 Lithuania	 13	 Trinidad	and	Tobago	 13	Ethiopia	 21	 Malawi	 8	 Turkey	 11	FYR	Macedonia	 14	 Maledives	 16	 Ukraine	 15	Fiji	 21	 Mali	 13	 United	Arab	Emirates	 14	Finland	 33	 Mexico	 15	 United	Kingdom	 33	France	 30	 Morocco	 17	 United	States	 12	Germany	 22	 Namibia	 7	 Uruguay	 10	Ghana	 12	 Netherlands	 18	 Yemen	 14	Greece	 20	 New	Zealand	 28	 Zambia	 8	Guyana	 6	 Niger	 18	 	 	
Source:	author’s										
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Table	2	Structure	of	the	sample	regarding	political	systems,	following	the	constitutional,	and	the	partisan	
partition		 Political	system	
Electoral	
regime	
Presidential	 Assembly	–	
Elected	
President	
Parliamentary	
Plural	
elections	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	233	
Bahrain	2003	–	2012;	Bolivia	2006	–	2012;	
Chile	2002	–	2009;	Egypt	2006	–	2011;	Ghana	
2005	–	2001;	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	1996	–	
2012;	Jordan	1990	–	2009;	Kazakhstan	2009	–	
2007;	Kenya	1998	–	2007;	Korea	2005	–	2012;	
Lithuania	2000,	2004;	Malawi	2005	–	2012;	
Maldives	1997	–	2009;	Mali	2000	–	2002;	
Mexico	1998	–	2000;	Morocco	1996	–	2012;	
Nigeria	2000	–	2012;	Pakistan	2003	–	2008;	
Panama	2003	–	2012;	Poland	1998	-	2007;	
Swaziland	2007	–	2012;	Syria	1990	–	2010;	
United	States	2001	–	2010;	Yemen	2000	–	2012;	
Zambia	2005	–	2011	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	35	
Bolivia	2003	–	2005;	Brazil	2007	–	2012;	Chile	
1993,	2010	–	2012;	Korea	2001	–	2004;	Mexico	
2001	–	2006,	2010	–	2012;	Niger	1995,	1996;	
Poland	2011	–	2012;	Ukraine	1998	–	99,	2000	–	
2002	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	33	
Bolivia	2000	–	2002;	Brazil	2000	–	2006;	Chile	
1994	–	2001;	Ghana	2001	–	2004;	Maldives	
2010	–	2012;	Mexico	2007	–	2009;	Poland	2008	
–	2010;	United	States	2011,	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	25	
Egypt	2004	–	
2005;	Greece	
1980	–	1986;	
Lebanon	2000	–	
2012;	Yemen	
1999	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
No	records	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	4	
Pakistan	2009	-	
2012	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	205	
Australia	1989	–	2010;	Belize	2002	–	2012;	
Canada	1981	–	2004,	2012;	Ethiopia	1996	–	
2000,	2006	–	2012;	Fiji	2000	–	2001;	France	
1983	–	1986,	2003	–	2012;	Greece	1987	–	
1999;	Hungary	2007	–	2012;	Italy	1995	–	96,	
2002	–	2008;	Japan	1981	–	83,	1987	–	2012;	
Lesotho	2000	–	2002,	2008	–	2012;	New	
Zealand	1985	–	1994;	Spain	1985	–	93,	2001	–	
2004,	2012;	Trinidad	and	Tobago	2001	–	2012;	
United	Kingdom	1980	–	2010;		
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	12	
Hungary	2005	–	06;	Italy	1994	,	1997	–	2001;	
Latvia	2007	–	2010	
		
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	104	
Australia	1999	–	2012;	Canada	1980,	2005	–	
2011;	France	1987	–	2002;	Germany	1991	–	
2012;	Greece	1993;	Italy	2009	–	2012;	Japan	
1980,	1984	–	86,	1994	–	96;	New	Zealand	1995	
–	2012;	1994	–	2011;	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
2000;	United	Kingdom	2011	-	2012	
Proportional	
elections	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	59	
Algeria	2003	–	2007;	Cape	Verde	2002	–	2011;	
Kazakhstan	2008	–	2012;	Liberia	2000	–	2003;	
Namibia	2006	–	2012;	Niger	2010	–	2011;	Peru	
2000	–	2012;	Poland	1998	–	2006;	Ukraine	
2011	–	2012;	Uruguay	2005	–	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	17	
Algeria	2001,	2002,	2008	–	2012;	Cape	Verde	
2012;	Israel	2001;	Peru	2001	–	2006;	Poland	
1996	–	97	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	7	
Colombia	1999	–	2002;	Israel	2000;	Uruguay	
2003	-	2004	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	25	
Bulgaria	2000	–	
2001;	Estonia	
1996	–	1999;	
Guyana	2007	–	
2012;	South	
Africa	2000	–	
2012;	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
No	records	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	2	
Estonia	2000	-	
2001	
POLARIZ	=	0	
N	=	29	
Bulgaria	2010	–	2012;	Ireland	1980	–	81,	
2007;	FYR	Macedonia	2003	–	2011;	Portugal	
2006	–	2009;	Turkey	2003	–	2012	
	
POLARIZ	=	1	
N	=	62	
Finland	1991	–	95,	2003	-	2011;	Iceland	1988	–	
91,	2000	–	2007;	Ireland	1988	–	94,	1998	-	
2012;	Israel	2002	–	2003;	Italy	1988	–	1993;	
Latvia	2000	–	2006	
	
POLARIZ	=	2	
N	=	213	
Austria	1988	–	2012;	Belgium	1980	–	2012;	
Denmark	1995	–	2012;	Finland	1980	–	90,	
1996	–	2002,	2012;	Iceland	1982	–	99,	2008	–	
09;	Ireland	1982	–	87,	1995	–	97;	Israel	2004	–	
2012;	Netherlands	1995	–	2012;	Norway	1980	
–	2012;	Portugal	1997	–	2012;	Sweden	1993	–	
2012;	Turkey	2002		
Source:	Database	of	Political	Institutions						
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Table	3	Average	values	of	current	fiscal	aggregates,	%	of	the	GDP	
Gross	public	revenues		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	26,827		POLARIZ	=1	26,918		POLARIZ	=	2	26,736		
POLARIZ	=	0	24,471		 POLARIZ	=	2	13,579		
POLARIZ	=	0	36,904		POLARIZ	=1	41,829		POLARIZ	=	2	40,563		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	29,308		POLARIZ	=1	31,545		POLARIZ	=	2	28,757		
POLARIZ	=	0	29,818		 POLARIZ	=	2	35,298		
POLARIZ	=	0	34,338		POLARIZ	=1	42,733		POLARIZ	=	2	48,972		
	
Gross	public	expenditures		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	29,052		POLARIZ	=	1	28,707		POLARIZ	=	2	30,884		
POLARIZ	=	0	34,103		POLARIZ	=	2	20,113		
POLARIZ	=	0	40,072		POLARIZ	=	1	46,832		POLARIZ	=	2	42,453		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	30,156		POLARIZ	=	1	33,067		POLARIZ	=	2	32,029		
POLARIZ	=	0	31,55		POLARIZ	=	2	34,134		
POLARIZ	=	0	37,476		POLARIZ	=	1	45,796		POLARIZ	=	2	49,926			 	
Structural	fiscal	balance		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0						-2,651		POLARIZ	=	1	-2,155		POLARIZ	=	2	-4,247		
POLARIZ	=	0	-16,676		 POLARIZ	=	2	n.a.		
POLARIZ	=	0	-3,643		POLARIZ	=	1	-4,305		POLARIZ	=	2	-1,726		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	-1,913		POLARIZ	=	1	-2,676		POLARIZ	=	2	-2,036		
POLARIZ	=	0	-2,607		POLARIZ	=	2	n.a.		
POLARIZ	=	0	-4,108		POLARIZ	=	1	-3,159		POLARIZ	=	2	-3,089		
Source:	author’s			
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Table	4	Average	values	of	capital	fiscal	aggregates,	%	of	the	GDP	
Gross	public	debt		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	55,186		POLARIZ	=	1	48,927		POLARIZ	=	2	55,383		
POLARIZ	=	0	112,071		POLARIZ	=	2	60,978		
POLARIZ	=	0	70,739		POLARIZ	=	1	75,684		POLARIZ	=	2	53,648		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	90,934		POLARIZ	=	1	39,432		POLARIZ	=	2	63,105		
POLARIZ	=	0	40,553		POLARIZ	=	2	4,954		
POLARIZ	=	0	42,491		POLARIZ	=	1	53,612		POLARIZ	=	2	62,025		
	
Net	public	debt		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	46,036		POLARIZ	=	1	31,829		POLARIZ	=	2	41,441		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	47,574		POLARIZ	=	1	65,77		POLARIZ	=	2	35,039		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	70,994		POLARIZ	=	1	18,32		POLARIZ	=	2	56,36		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	34,581		POLARIZ	=	1	18,165		POLARIZ	=	2	15,254			 	
Financial	assets	held	by	the	government	(gross	debt	minus	net	debt)		 Political	system	
Electoral	regime	 Presidential	 Assembly	–	Elected	President	 Parliamentary	
Plural	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	9,151		POLARIZ	=	1	17,098		POLARIZ	=	2	13,942		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	23,165		POLARIZ	=	1	9,915		POLARIZ	=	2	18,609		
Proportional	elections	 POLARIZ	=	0	19,94		POLARIZ	=	1	21,112		POLARIZ	=	2	6,745		
POLARIZ	=	0		POLARIZ	=	1		POLARIZ	=	2			
POLARIZ	=	0	7,91		POLARIZ	=	1	35,447		POLARIZ	=	2	46,771		
Source:	author’s	 			
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Table	5	Results	of	regression	tests	as	for	the	explanation	of	gross	national	savings,	as	defined	by	IMF	
Explained	variable:	std(Gross	national	savings,	as	defined	by	IMF)															SAMPLE:	GENERAL	
N	=	721	
R2	=	0,323	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,08	 (0,036)	 p	=	0,028	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,46	 (0,072)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,473	 (0,072)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,035	 (0,028)	 p	=	0,205	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,2	 (0,024)	 p	<	0,001	Constant	 -	0,152	 (0,022)	 p	<	0,001	
	
Explained	variable:	std(Gross	national	savings,	as	defined	by	IMF)					SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#1	
N	=	71	
R2	=	0,408	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,363	 (0,248)	 p	=	0,147	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	1,73	 (0,388)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 1,623	 (0,413)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,482	 (0,138)	 p	<	0,001	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	1,114	 (0,324)	 p	=	0,001	Constant	 -	0,31	 (0,14)	 p	=	0,031		
Explained	variable:	std(Gross	national	savings,	as	defined	by	IMF)					SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#2	
N	=	125	
R2	=	0,551	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,134	 (0,099)	 p	=	0,177	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,22	 (0,108)	 p	=	0,044	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,206	 (0,104)	 p	=	0,051	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,027	 (0,049)	 p	=	0,582	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,393	 (0,087)	 p	<	0,001	Constant	 -	0,16	 (0,036)	 p	<	0,001		
Explained	variable:	std(Gross	national	savings,	as	defined	by	IMF)					SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#3	
N	=	187	
R2	=	0,574	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,26	 (0,063)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,672	 (0,118)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,712	 (0,13)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,032	 (0,04)	 p	=	0,418	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,111	 (0,043)	 p	=	0,012	Constant	 0,001	 (0,083)	 p	=	0,988	
Source:	author’s					
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Table	6	Results	of	regression	tests	as	for	the	explanation	of	private	investment	
Explained	variable:	std(Private	investment)											SAMPLE:	GENERAL	
N	=	751	
R2	=	0,166	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,062	 (0,044)	 p	=	0,157	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,766	 (0,086)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,589	 (0,089)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,138	 (0,03)	 p	<	0,001	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,087	 (0,028)	 p	=	0,002	Constant	 -	0,01	 (0,027)	 p	=	0,692		
Explained	variable:		std(Private	investment)				SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#1	
N	=	71	
R2	=	0,472	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,661	 (0,527)	 p	=	0,214	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,522	 (0,661)	 p	=	0,443	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 1,397	 (0,508)	 p	=	0,008	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,452	 (0,151)	 p	=	0,004	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	2,83	 (0,524)	 p	<	0,001	Constant	 -	0,133	 (0,234)	 p	=	0,573		
Explained	variable:		std(Private	investment)					SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#2	
N	=	125	
R2	=	0,239	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,313	 (0,178)	 p	=	0,080	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,334	 (0,209)	 p	=	0,113	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,154	 (0,202)	 p	=	0,450	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,014	 (0,102)	 p	=	0,893	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,385	 (0,152)	 p	=	0,012	Constant	 -	0,069	 (0,07)	 p	=	0,330		
Explained	variable:		std(Private	investment)					SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#3	
N	=	187	
R2	=	0,252		
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,082	 (0,08)	 p	=	0,305	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,926	 (0,164)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 0,757	 (0,195)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,224	 (0,056)	 p	<	0,001	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,254	 (0,061)	 p	<	0,001	Constant	 0,078	 (0,108)	 p	=	0,468	
Source:	author’s					
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Table	7	Results	of	regression	tests	as	for	the	explanation	of	the	primary	completion	rate	
Explained	variable:	std(Primary	completion	rate)														SAMPLE:	GENERAL	
N	=	449	
R2	=	0,041	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,068	 (0,038)	 p	=	0,071	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,199	 (0,075)	 p	=	0,008	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,158	 (0,073)	 p	=	0,032	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,053	 (0,026)	 p	=	0,045	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,101	 (0,023)	 p	<	0,001	Constant	 0,219	 (0,028)	 p	<	0,001		
Explained	variable:	std(Primary	completion	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#1	
N	=	61	
R2	=	0,208		
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,366	 (0,247)	 p	=	0,144	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,6	 (0,395)	 p	=	0,134	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,28	 (0,366)	 p	=	0,447	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,292	 (0,147)	 p	=	0,052	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 0,727	 (0,358)	 p	=	0,047	Constant	 0,577	 (0,211)	 p	=	0,008		
Explained	variable:	std(Primary	completion	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#2	
N	=	37	
R2	=	0,430	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,196	 (0,066)	 p	=	0,006	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,128	 (0,085)	 p	=	0,141	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,37	 (0,105)	 p	=	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,162	 (0,05)	 p	=	0,003	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,174	 (0,066)	 p	=	0,013	Constant	 0,451	 (0,038)	 p	<	0,001		
Explained	variable:	std(Primary	completion	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#3	
N	=	109	
R2	=	0,445	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,634	 (0,119)	 p	<	0,001	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,075	 (0,143)	 p	=	0,600	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,007	 (0,191)	 p	=	0,972	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 0,042	 (0,059)	 p	=	0,479	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,023	 (0,045)	 p	=	0,604	Constant	 0,384	 (0,155)	 p	=	0,015	
Source:	author’s					
	 41	
Table	8	Results	of	regression	tests	as	for	the	vulnerable	employment	rate		
Explained	variable:	std(Vulnerable	employment	rate)														SAMPLE:	GENERAL	
N	=	592	
R2	=	0,419	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,052	 (0,056)	 p	=	0,354	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,212	 (0,077)	 p	=	0,006	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,313	 (0,079)	 p	<	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,15	 (0,035)	 p	<	0,001	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,05	 (0,029)	 p	=	0,081	Constant	 0,012	 (0,033)	 p	=	0,721		
Explained	variable:	std(Vulnerable	employment	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#1	
N	=	52	
R2	=	0,244	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 -	0,756	 (0,451)	 p	=	0,101	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,327	 (0,645)	 p	=	0,614	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,899	 (0,618)	 p	=	0,152	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,163	 (0,234)	 p	=	0,489	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	1,419	 (0,889)	 p	=	0,117	Constant	 -	0,674	 (0,459)	 p	=	0,149		
Explained	variable:	std(Vulnerable	employment	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#2	
N	=	99	
R2	=	0,386		
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,538	 (0,205)	 p	=	0,010	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,596	 (0,307)	 p	=	0,055	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	1,035	 (0,324)	 p	=	0,002	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,037	 (0,129)	 p	=	0,775	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,507	 (0,171)	 p	=	0,004	Constant	 -	0,517	 (0,046)	 p	<	0,001		
Explained	variable:	std(Vulnerable	employment	rate)														SAMPLE:	CLUSTER	#3	
N	=	153	
R2	=	0,641	
Explanatory	variable	
	
Coefficient	of	
regression	
	
Robust	standard	
error	
	
Significance	level	as	given	by	t	
Student	test	
	std(Gross	public	debt,	%	GDP)	 0,129	 (0,056)	 p	=	0,022	std(Gross	public	expenditures,	%	of	GDP)	 0,009	 (0,067)	 p	=	0,895	std(Gross	public	revenues	as	%	of	the	GDP)	 -	0,356	 (0,106)	 p	=	0,001	std(Structural	fiscal	balance	(%	of	GDP)	 -	0,111	 (0,036)	 p	=	0,002	std(Financial	assets	held	by	the	government,	%	of	GDP)	 -	0,004	 (0,025)	 p	=	0,871	Constant	 -	0,14	 (0,097)	 p	=	0,150	
Source:	author’s					
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Table	9	–	Bolivia,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	
public	debt,	
%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	
%	of	GDP	(gross	
minus	net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	
%	of	the	
GDP	
Gross	
fiscal	
balance	
(%	of	
GDP)	2000	 n.a.	 66,891	 58,93	 7,961	 29,314	 25,586	 -3,728	2001	 n.a.	 59,957	 51,729	 8,228	 31,955	 25,135	 -6,82	2002	 n.a.	 69,144	 62,116	 7,028	 33,293	 24,505	 -8,788	2003	 n.a.	 74,066	 66,444	 7,622	 31,99	 24,114	 -7,876	2004	 n.a.	 89,567	 81,006	 8,561	 32,345	 26,801	 -5,544	2005	 n.a.	 80,375	 71,088	 9,287	 33,183	 30,938	 -2,245	2006	 n.a.	 55,23	 41,886	 13,344	 29,834	 34,304	 4,47	2007	 n.a.	 40,506	 27,258	 13,248	 32,653	 34,393	 1,74	2008	 n.a.	 37,155	 20,607	 16,548	 35,333	 38,902	 3,569	2009	 n.a.	 39,992	 23,144	 16,848	 35,82	 35,834	 0,014	2010	 n.a.	 38,52	 18,382	 20,138	 31,5	 33,165	 1,665	2011	 n.a.	 34,687	 14,438	 20,249	 35,377	 36,209	 0,832	2012	 n.a.	 33,424	 11,059	 22,365	 36,104	 37,861	 1,757		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	
of	GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	
of	GDP	
Current	
account	
balance,	%	
of	GDP	
Primary	
completion	rate,	
total	(%	of	
relevant	age	
group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	
(%	of	total	
employment)	
POLARIZ,	as	
in	DPI	
	
2000	 18,143	 11,019	 -5,324	 96,041	 66,1	 2	 	2001	 14,268	 11,252	 -3,36	 95,85	 64,9	 2	 	2002	 16,295	 12,319	 -4,42	 99,17	 63,7	 2	 	2003	 13,232	 14,59	 1,042	 97,98	 59,2	 1	 	2004	 11,022	 17,045	 3,694	 	 59,2	 1	 	2005	 14,254	 19,877	 5,863	 	 60	 1	 	2006	 13,865	 26,56	 11,225	 99,088	 61	 0	 	2007	 15,187	 28,593	 11,396	 96,079	 57	 0	 	2008	 17,553	 28,952	 11,859	 97,092	 57,1	 0	 	2009	 16,971	 22,878	 4,27	 92,345	 54,9	 0	 	2010	 17,007	 24,969	 3,869	 92,897	 	 0	 	2011	 19,562	 25,329	 0,318	 92,293	 	 0	 	2012	 17,669	 25,735	 7,812	 	 	 0	 	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank										
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Table	10	The	U.S.	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
2001	 -1,682	 53,005	 33,761	 19,244	 33,822	 32,113	2002	 -3,854	 55,366	 36,342	 19,024	 34,844	 29,774	2003	 -4,943	 58,507	 39,712	 18,795	 35,395	 29,144	2004	 -4,971	 65,483	 46,878	 18,605	 35,105	 29,292	2005	 -4,167	 64,882	 46,259	 18,623	 35,212	 30,645	2006	 -3,498	 63,635	 44,755	 18,88	 34,972	 31,542	2007	 -4,327	 64,005	 44,481	 19,524	 35,693	 31,659	2008	 -6,196	 72,833	 50,435	 22,398	 37,986	 30,174	2009	 -7,905	 86,054	 62,108	 23,946	 43,121	 28,403	2010	 -9,745	 94,807	 69,694	 25,113	 41,313	 28,775	2011	 -8,336	 99,005	 76,223	 22,782	 40,083	 29,049	2012	 -6,777	 102,355	 80,122	 22,233	 38,718	 29,045		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
2001	 22,045	 19,426	 -3,733	 100,83	 n.a.	 0	2002	 21,571	 18,112	 -4,169	 100,281	 n.a.	 0	2003	 21,657	 17,301	 -4,505	 100,218	 n.a.	 0	2004	 22,523	 17,512	 -5,126	 98,777	 n.a.	 0	2005	 23,22	 17,849	 -5,649	 97,456	 n.a.	 0	2006	 23,33	 19,141	 -5,762	 96,307	 n.a.	 0	2007	 22,347	 17,311	 -4,927	 98,284	 n.a.	 0	2008	 20,784	 15,502	 -4,629	 97,903	 n.a.	 0	2009	 17,514	 14,369	 -2,647	 98,235	 n.a.	 0	2010	 18,402	 15,075	 -3,005	 97,826	 n.a.	 0	2011	 18,442	 15,845	 -2,947	 97,538	 n.a.	 2	2012	 19,047	 16,336	 -2,711	 97,866	 n.a.	 2	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank												
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Table	11	Mexico,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
1998	 -5,424	 44,1	 37,718	 6,382	 22,358	 16,727	1999	 -5,86	 46,327	 38,785	 7,542	 22,412	 16,917	2000	 -4,005	 41,857	 35,41	 6,447	 20,908	 17,902	2001	 -3,152	 41,11	 35,59	 5,52	 21,242	 18,174	2002	 -3,465	 43,468	 38,067	 5,401	 22,119	 18,764	2003	 -2,587	 44,747	 35,583	 9,164	 22,497	 20,187	2004	 -2,067	 40,857	 32,847	 8,01	 20,307	 19,058	2005	 -2,359	 39,041	 31,52	 7,521	 21,66	 20,429	2006	 -2,5	 37,777	 29,772	 8,005	 22,569	 21,594	2007	 -2,512	 37,564	 29,089	 8,475	 22,83	 21,675	2008	 -2,453	 42,85	 33,169	 9,681	 25,637	 24,668	2009	 -4,823	 43,945	 36,252	 7,693	 27,207	 22,126	2010	 -4,549	 42,241	 36,248	 5,993	 26,715	 22,445	2011	 -4,193	 43,272	 37,524	 5,748	 26,287	 22,942	2012	 -4,457	 43,284	 37,795	 5,489	 27,162	 23,461		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
1998	 26,825	 23,168	 -3,186	 	 34,4	 0	1999	 25,704	 22,355	 -2,408	 94,628	 34,1	 0	2000	 25,982	 22,373	 -2,734	 94,953	 31,8	 0	2001	 23,382	 19,899	 -2,443	 95,133	 32	 1	2002	 22,608	 20,492	 -1,906	 95,984	 32,6	 1	2003	 21,887	 20,718	 -1,169	 95,373	 32,7	 1	2004	 22,662	 21,752	 -0,91	 96,515	 32,4	 1	2005	 22,284	 21,25	 -1,034	 96,64	 31	 1	2006	 23,457	 22,65	 -0,806	 96,346	 29,7	 1	2007	 23,383	 21,977	 -1,406	 96,517	 29,5	 2	2008	 24,42	 22,587	 -1,833	 95,162	 29,2	 2	2009	 22,887	 21,976	 -0,911	 92,944	 	 2	2010	 22,033	 21,688	 -0,344	 92,657	 	 1	2011	 22,296	 21,244	 -1,052	 92,722	 	 1	2012	 23,242	 21,994	 -1,248	 99,121	 	 1	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank							
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Table	12	Poland,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
1995	 -5,824	 48,989	 -3,383	 52,372	 47,715	 43,3	1996	 -5,76	 43,39	 -1,287	 44,677	 51,006	 46,141	1997	 -5,818	 42,926	 0,068	 42,858	 46,44	 41,809	1998	 -5,141	 38,889	 1,434	 37,455	 44,344	 40,068	1999	 -2,944	 39,567	 6,346	 33,221	 42,718	 40,407	2000	 -3,995	 36,787	 6,918	 29,869	 41,081	 38,053	2001	 -4,876	 37,562	 13,9	 23,662	 43,803	 38,532	2002	 -5,269	 42,16	 13,385	 28,775	 44,258	 39,272	2003	 -6,034	 47,053	 17,626	 29,427	 44,677	 38,485	2004	 -5,618	 45,686	 15,146	 30,54	 42,623	 37,239	2005	 -3,421	 47,088	 15,867	 31,221	 43,44	 39,367	2006	 -4,796	 47,738	 14,991	 32,747	 43,864	 40,235	2007	 -2,62	 44,986	 10,218	 34,768	 42,187	 40,306	2008	 -4,162	 47,106	 9,92	 37,186	 43,23	 39,546	2009	 -7,133	 50,88	 14,921	 35,959	 44,614	 37,206	2010	 -7,575	 54,838	 20,502	 34,336	 45,424	 37,567	2011	 -5,51	 56,218	 26,179	 30,039	 43,436	 38,415	2012	 -3,803	 55,59	 27,556	 28,034	 42,313	 38,381		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
1995	 18,716	 19,33	 0,614	 94,592	 25,9	 	1996	 20,875	 18,792	 -2,083	 97,51	 25,4	 1	1997	 23,429	 19,773	 -3,657	 98,839	 25	 1	1998	 25,061	 21,049	 -4,012	 97,278	 23,4	 0	1999	 25,26	 17,817	 -7,442	 96,5	 23	 0	2000	 24,85	 18,811	 -6,039	 95,451	 23,5	 0	2001	 20,771	 17,648	 -3,123	 97,113	 24,3	 0	2002	 18,624	 15,827	 -2,797	 96,957	 24,4	 0	2003	 18,742	 16,218	 -2,524	 98,284	 23,2	 0	2004	 20,069	 14,829	 -5,24	 98,918	 22,5	 0	2005	 19,266	 16,884	 -2,382	 96,175	 21,8	 0	2006	 21,052	 17,205	 -3,848	 95,508	 20,4	 0	2007	 24,445	 18,214	 -6,231	 95,322	 19,4	 0	2008	 23,9	 17,297	 -6,603	 	 18,9	 2	2009	 20,347	 16,371	 -3,976	 94,791	 18,6	 2	2010	 20,998	 15,883	 -5,115	 95,365	 18,6	 2	2011	 22,058	 17,206	 -4,853	 95,451	 18,4	 1	2012	 20,416	 16,911	 -3,505	 	 18,2	 1	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank		
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Table	13	New	Zealand,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
1985	 -4,962	 67,076	 42,954	 24,122	 41,853	 35,661	1986	 -3,991	 71,628	 46,897	 24,731	 42,523	 37,826	1987	 -2,838	 65,834	 44,866	 20,968	 41,823	 38,853	1988	 -1,193	 57,232	 43,956	 13,276	 41,834	 40,276	1989	 -0,807	 57,65	 49,079	 8,571	 43,531	 41,719	1990	 -0,672	 58,179	 50,136	 8,043	 45,052	 42,723	1991	 -2,421	 60,776	 53,008	 7,768	 48,144	 42,72	1992	 -1,984	 61,549	 53,888	 7,661	 47,766	 42,22	1993	 0,707	 57,252	 48,311	 8,941	 42,557	 41,321	1994	 2,011	 51,386	 44,081	 7,305	 38,954	 40,918	1995	 2,699	 45,577	 38,61	 6,967	 37,821	 41,331	1996	 1,822	 39,072	 32,245	 6,827	 36,259	 38,742	1997	 1,422	 36,302	 29,538	 6,764	 35,741	 36,998	1998	 0,78	 36,213	 26,949	 9,264	 36,553	 36,25	1999	 -0,095	 33,57	 23,543	 10,027	 35,713	 34,827	2000	 0,439	 31,573	 21,742	 9,831	 34,922	 35,205	2001	 1,244	 29,553	 20,129	 9,424	 33,885	 35,183	2002	 1,8	 27,698	 18,871	 8,827	 33,45	 35,901	2003	 2,081	 25,9	 17,255	 8,645	 33,321	 36,802	2004	 2,604	 23,572	 14,42	 9,152	 32,832	 37,047	2005	 3,141	 21,755	 11,301	 10,454	 33,681	 38,478	2006	 2,448	 19,306	 8,781	 10,525	 34,427	 38,77	2007	 2,606	 17,18	 6,495	 10,685	 33,863	 37,283	2008	 1,229	 20,119	 7,369	 12,75	 35,4	 36,886	2009	 -1,01	 25,731	 11,64	 14,091	 37,075	 35,54	2010	 -4,017	 31,937	 16,947	 14,99	 40,036	 34,921	2011	 -3,652	 36,975	 22,08	 14,895	 39,74	 34,873	2012	 -0,942	 37,487	 25,33	 12,157	 36,395	 34,804		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
1985	 26,594	 19,254	 -7,288	 n.a.	 	 0	1986	 24,104	 19,255	 -6,395	 n.a.	 	 0	1987	 22,445	 18,586	 -4,803	 n.a.	 	 0	1988	 20,005	 18,398	 -0,924	 n.a.	 	 0	1989	 22,038	 18,157	 -3,665	 n.a.	 	 0	1990	 20,478	 16,884	 -3,465	 n.a.	 	 0	1991	 16,193	 14,402	 -3,047	 n.a.	 12,7	 0	1992	 17,576	 14,477	 -4,397	 n.a.	 13	 0	1993	 20,003	 17,03	 -4,115	 n.a.	 13,1	 0	1994	 21,532	 18,817	 -3,98	 n.a.	 12,7	 0	
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1995	 22,508	 19,662	 -4,953	 n.a.	 12,8	 2	1996	 22,684	 18,262	 -5,813	 n.a.	 13,4	 2	1997	 21,667	 16,755	 -6,162	 n.a.	 12,8	 2	1998	 20,127	 15,757	 -3,635	 n.a.	 12,7	 2	1999	 21,199	 15,249	 -6,05	 n.a.	 13,6	 2	2000	 21,763	 16,73	 -4,596	 n.a.	 13,5	 2	2001	 20,861	 19,625	 -2,256	 n.a.	 12,6	 2	2002	 22,383	 19,991	 -3,619	 n.a.	 12,3	 2	2003	 22,535	 20,755	 -2,478	 n.a.	 12,1	 2	2004	 24,157	 19,437	 -4,616	 n.a.	 12,1	 2	2005	 24,532	 17,088	 -7,158	 n.a.	 11,9	 2	2006	 23,021	 15,929	 -7,234	 n.a.	 12,1	 2	2007	 23,88	 16,513	 -6,91	 n.a.	 11,8	 2	2008	 22,742	 15,345	 -7,799	 n.a.	 12,1	 2	2009	 18,978	 16,683	 -2,274	 n.a.	 	 2	2010	 19,239	 16,956	 -2,256	 n.a.	 	 2	2011	 18,926	 16,009	 -2,892	 n.a.	 	 2	2012	 20,189	 16,051	 -4,115	 n.a.	 	 2	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank		
Table	14	Finland,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
1980	 	 10,823	 -177,082	 187,905	 44,611	 46,919	1981	 	 11,477	 -175,615	 187,092	 45,331	 49,539	1982	 	 13,76	 -161,868	 175,628	 47,216	 49,008	1983	 	 15,308	 -153,105	 168,413	 49,11	 48,828	1984	 	 15,124	 -152,463	 167,587	 48,466	 50,518	1985	 	 15,803	 -159,856	 175,659	 50,458	 52,372	1986	 	 16,416	 -164,49	 180,906	 51,138	 53,843	1987	 	 17,622	 -164,47	 182,092	 52,104	 52,147	1988	 	 16,514	 -172,02	 188,534	 50,654	 54,907	1989	 	 14,275	 -196,067	 210,342	 47,927	 54,515	1990	 	 13,839	 -208,271	 222,11	 48,142	 54,207	1991	 	 21,9	 -200,579	 222,479	 57,107	 56,664	1992	 	 39,361	 -146,494	 185,855	 62,371	 56,615	1993	 	 54,226	 -94,942	 149,168	 65,203	 56,171	1994	 	 56,532	 -96,843	 153,375	 64,063	 56,714	1995	 	 55,518	 -23,998	 79,516	 61,802	 54,922	1996	 	 55,723	 -39,912	 95,635	 60,123	 56,145	1997	 	 52,854	 -44,515	 97,369	 56,568	 54,93	1998	 	 47,619	 -86,782	 134,401	 52,921	 54,506	1999	 0,835	 45,664	 -50,277	 95,941	 51,789	 53,445	2000	 5,33	 43,793	 -31,092	 74,885	 48,416	 55,359	2001	 3,937	 42,46	 -31,65	 74,11	 47,997	 53,076	2002	 3,65	 41,468	 -31,318	 72,786	 49,04	 53,147	2003	 2,252	 44,511	 -38,443	 82,954	 50,336	 52,776	2004	 1,341	 44,387	 -46,674	 91,061	 50,24	 52,489	2005	 1,685	 41,703	 -58,591	 100,294	 50,348	 53,038	
	 48	
2006	 2,236	 39,632	 -69,424	 109,056	 49,195	 53,274	2007	 2,069	 35,158	 -72,521	 107,679	 47,389	 52,728	2008	 1,599	 33,939	 -52,292	 86,231	 49,212	 53,557	2009	 0,182	 43,522	 -62,848	 106,37	 56,122	 53,406	2010	 -1,22	 48,664	 -65,561	 114,225	 55,794	 52,984	2011	 -0,994	 49,193	 -54,255	 103,448	 55,267	 54,113	2012	 -1,126	 53,616	 -55,422	 109,038	 56,61	 54,446		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
1980	 30,141	 27,364	 -2,726	 	 	 2	1981	 27,328	 26,238	 -0,803	 	 	 2	1982	 27,445	 24,876	 -1,702	 	 	 2	1983	 27,01	 24,444	 -2,087	 	 	 2	1984	 25,909	 25,308	 0,074	 	 	 2	1985	 25,418	 24,345	 -1,338	 	 	 2	1986	 24,347	 24,086	 -0,934	 	 	 2	1987	 25,059	 23,676	 -1,904	 104,13	 	 2	1988	 27,43	 25,931	 -2,521	 105,881	 	 2	1989	 30,44	 25,398	 -4,943	 105,588	 	 2	1990	 28,46	 23,658	 -5,02	 101,788	 	 2	1991	 22,129	 16,33	 -5,355	 97,388	 	 1	1992	 18,765	 13,655	 -4,618	 96,741	 	 1	1993	 16,308	 14,758	 -1,288	 96,113	 	 1	1994	 17,501	 18,064	 1,087	 97,197	 	 1	1995	 18,19	 21,663	 4,09	 100,636	 12,1	 1	1996	 17,775	 20,679	 4,01	 101,391	 12,7	 2	1997	 19,171	 23,753	 5,566	 100,522	 10,9	 2	1998	 20,364	 24,786	 5,612	 98,154	 10,8	 2	1999	 19,506	 24,656	 5,342	 95,983	 9,6	 2	2000	 20,814	 28,59	 7,776	 96,332	 9,2	 2	2001	 20,425	 28,779	 8,354	 102,291	 9	 2	2002	 19,101	 27,56	 8,459	 101,012	 8,9	 2	2003	 19,371	 24,199	 4,828	 102,075	 8,7	 1	2004	 19,949	 26,147	 6,198	 100,35	 8,3	 1	2005	 21,798	 25,149	 3,351	 100,36	 8,8	 1	2006	 21,264	 25,421	 4,157	 96,908	 8,8	 1	2007	 22,852	 27,117	 4,265	 98,161	 8,6	 1	2008	 22,224	 24,839	 2,615	 98,562	 9	 1	2009	 18,518	 20,286	 1,769	 97,428	 9,6	 1	2010	 18,447	 19,964	 1,517	 97,965	 9,2	 1	2011	 20,537	 19,036	 -1,5	 97,424	 9,3	 1	2012	 19,849	 17,787	 -1,663	 99,262	 9,6	 2	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank					
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Table	15	Israel,	country	profile	from	the	database	used	in	quantitative	research	
Year	 Structural	
balance,	%	of	
potential	GDP	
Gross	public	
debt,	%	GDP	
Net	public	
debt,	%	
GDP	
Financial	assets	%	
of	GDP	(gross	minus	
net	debt)	
Gross	public	
expenditures,	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	public	
revenues	as	%	
of	the	GDP	
2000	 -6,375	 81,402	 71,6	 9,802	 49,189	 45,387	2001	 -7,001	 85,969	 76,8	 9,169	 51,487	 45,303	2002	 -6,53	 93,072	 85	 8,072	 52,928	 45,315	2003	 -5,558	 95,567	 87,6	 7,967	 51,577	 43,737	2004	 -4,38	 94,116	 87,6	 6,516	 48,653	 42,701	2005	 -3,595	 90,626	 83,8	 6,826	 47,369	 42,47	2006	 -1,815	 81,627	 74,8	 6,827	 45,695	 43,136	2007	 -1,727	 74,622	 69,2	 5,422	 43,956	 42,434	2008	 -3,699	 72,925	 69,1	 3,825	 43,215	 39,471	2009	 -5,736	 75,269	 70,8	 4,469	 43,074	 36,743	2010	 -4,906	 71,451	 69,1	 2,351	 42,177	 37,623	2011	 -4,431	 69,706	 68	 1,706	 41,883	 37,712	2012	 -5,396	 68,202	 67,4	 0,802	 41,012	 36,378		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Year	 Private	
investment	%	of	
GDP	
Gross	
nationals	
savings	%	of	
GDP	
Current	
account	
balance	
Primary	completion	
rate,	total	(%	of	
relevant	age	group)	
Vulnerable	
employment,	total	(%	
of	total	employment)	
polariz	
2000	 21,583	 19,993	 -1,59	 	 7,1	 2	2001	 20,886	 19,291	 -1,594	 	 6,9	 1	2002	 19,423	 18,325	 -1,098	 104,484	 7	 1	2003	 18,541	 19,055	 0,514	 104,555	 7,3	 1	2004	 18,516	 20,154	 1,637	 108,145	 7,2	 2	2005	 19,472	 22,432	 2,96	 104,141	 7,5	 2	2006	 19,683	 24,346	 4,662	 102,726	 7,9	 2	2007	 20,45	 23,627	 3,177	 103,486	 7,4	 2	2008	 20,053	 21,494	 1,441	 100,204	 7,2	 2	2009	 17,624	 21,471	 3,846	 103,292	 	 2	2010	 18,126	 21,221	 3,095	 101,597	 	 2	2011	 20,184	 21,445	 1,261	 100,975	 	 2	2012	 20,677	 21,006	 0,33	 	 	 2	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund,	World	Bank					
